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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Potentiality is a category of explanation which itself
needs to be explained. As a category of explanation its
function is highly successful. But philosophy is not satis-
fied with this good showing, and is critical enough to in-
vestigate the metaphysical implications of so useful a concept.
It may be that this category is a subjective fiction, or if
valid it may have some very significant metaphysical impli-
cations .
I. STATEMENT OP THE PROBLEM AND METHOD OF PROCEDURE
The primary problem of this study will be to investi-
gate some of the metaphysical issues connected with the con-
cept of potentiality. To do this the meaning of the concept
will have to be clarified, and its use by several significant
philosophers will be considered. The present status of the
concept will then be investigated, and the metaphysical impli-
cations will be brought out and analyzed.
II. DEFINITION
In an inquiry of this kind there is a certain sense in
which the definition of its subject can adequately be given
only at the end of the investigation. Yet it is necessary to
delineate the field of investigation somewhat, so a preliminary
ft m
.
2definition will be in order. The most general and formal
statement of such a definition may be expressed in these
terms: Potentiality is what is capable of coming into actu-
ality, or the potential is what may become actual. This
definition is not very illuminating, but it does give the
formal meaning of the category. A little reflection will
show that even in this formal definition the potential can be
considered such only in relation to the actual. This is true
both in a logical and in a real sense. The concept of po-
tentiality implies the concept of actuality, for the concept
of potentiality points to actuality or it would not be the
concept of potentiality. Potentiality is thus the ability to
become what now is not, potentiality, qua potentiality, is
such because it implies the actuality of what now is not
actual. That the potential has meaning only in relation to
the actual is even more obvious when the potentiality of a
thing is considered. In this sense potentiality Aeans the
ability of the thing to do or receive any one or more defi-
nite types of determinations consistent with the nature of
the original thing. Thus we cannot speak of the potentiality
of an acorn with any intelligible meaning unless we have in
mind, for example, the concept of an oak. The acorn is not
merely potential. It is a potential oak.
The concept of potentiality must be distinguished from
the concept of possibility. Every potentiality is a possi-
bility, but not every possibility is a potentiality. Possi-
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5bility is a logical concept primarily U.e. the thinkable),
whereas potentiality is limited to reality. ^n its widest
sense anything conceivable may be considered possible. Thus
it is possible that there should be a realm of round squares,
though, of course, in any realm that has meaning for us such
a conceDtion is impossible. In a more sensible use of possi-
bility we would say that any self-consistent concept is
possible. Thus the existence of elves and fairies is possible.
But in neither use would the concept be synonymous with po-
tentiality. Potentiality applies to reality as we know it.
There is a sense, however, in which potentiality is
broader than possibility. That is when possibility is used
in the sense of probability. Thus every acorn is a potential
oak, but the possibility (probability) of any one acorn be-
coming an oak is very limited. Paradoxical as it may seem,
the reason possibility in this sense is more limited than po-
tentiality is that it is more inclusive than potentiality.
Potentiality applies to the acorn in isolation, but the possi-
bility of that acorn becoming an oak involves a whole complex
of relevant factors, e.g., that the acorn shall be planted,
that the soil be good, that water be present, that the right
temperature prevail, etc. The concrete possibility of a thing
involves the complete environment of that thing. In this
concrete sense possibility is more akin to actualization than
potentiality.
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4In a general way the difference between potentiality
and possibility may also be expressed by showing the logical
opposite of each term. Thus the proper opposite of potenti-
ality is actuality. The proper opposite of possibility is
not so much actuality but impossibility and necessity.
Potentiality is at times used in both an active and
a passive sense. When this distinction is made then active
»
potentiality is equivalent to "tendency;" passive potentiality
is equivalent to "capacity." The acorn’s tendency to become
an oak is active potentiality. The wax’s capacity to receive
impressions is passive potentiality. But potentiality in
the passive sense must be used with discretion. As Bradley
pointed out,-*- it is possible for a fruit stone to lodge in a
man’s throat and cause his strangulation, but it can hardly
be said that a fruit stone has the potentiality for strangu-
lation. Such a description, at least, is not a fruitful one.
III. REVIEW OP PREVIOUS RELATED STUDIES
A survey of recent philosophic literature reveals that
the subject of potentiality has been conspicuously avoided,
as a separate study, except by the Neo-Scholastics. Several
German philosophers have written books on possibility,^ but
TT ARj 387.
2. Meinong, MUW; Verweyen, PDM; Baumgardt, DM:
Gallinger, POM; Pichler, MUW; Hartmann, MUW
.
’.
*
• r
.
.
V
.
' S .0
.
.
'•*;?.> >
*
'
-<' j 6C. tv ‘ :.r -r.t
i 1
,
. .
'
.
:
.
-
•'
'r -
'
• i : >
,
.K
.
» :
5only one English writer (Buchanan) has written a book about
it.
3
The University of California publication. Possibility ,
is of composite authorship. In addition to the articles in
this volume a few more articles on the same subject have
appeared in periodicals, but only two articles have been
found on "Potentiality."
Charles E. Whitmore writing on "The Paradox of Po-
tentiality"^ argues that the concept of potentiality does
not imply preformation, but only asserts the arrival of
novelty. The time span is a duration with memory at one end
and anticipation at the other. In the conscious experience
of potentiality we anticipate more at the end of the process
than we started with. What we anticipate, however, is based
on past experience. The paradox of potentiality is the fact
that it is an experience of anticipation, but is based on
retrospection. This suggestive treatment of potentiality is
based on Baldwin’s psychological analysis 3 and the concept
of the specious present. It is valuable, but does not
pretend to consider the metaphysical implications of the
concept
.
Professor Demos 3 though entitling his article "Possi-
bility and Becoming" uses the word "possibility" in the sense
37 POS.
4. Art. (1959).
5. Art. "Potentiality" Baldwin, DPF
.
Art. (1926).6 .
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6of potentiality. Process and becoming can be explained only
by the reality of the possible, for "process is the injection
of possibility into actuality."^ Without possibility there
would be no spontaneity, no emergence, but only determinism
or chance. Possibility has as much or as little reality as
actuality. Either both are real, or both are abstractions.
They stand or fall together, for, in process, the actual
disappears as soon as it appears. Yet he does not tell us
where to place the reality of possibility. He states that
actuality and possibility both have a common ground, but he
will not deal with this metaphysical ground beyond saying
that the consideration of the nature of that ground takes one
o
to the roots of metaphysics.
A historical survey of possibility is given by Cohen0
but he deals mostly v/ith the logical aspect of possibility,
rather than with potentiality. Likewise Hollands 10 reviews
possibility in the writings of Spinoza and Leibnitz, but does
so primarily to criticize G. E. Moore’s and Bertrand Russell’s
theory of "essence ” and judgment. 11
T. Ibid., 234,5.
8. Ibid., 240.
9. Art. (1930).
10.
Art. (1907).
Ibid., 613-615.11 .
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In analyzing the potentiality of things D. L. Miller-1-
shows that "the potentiality of a specific thing is known
only when we have stated the lav; which the thing in question
follows." 13 But since this law is revealed only in the
thing’s interaction with its environment, the potentiality of
a thing can be determined only in relation to its environ-
ment. 13 These activistic and organic aspects of D. L.
Miller’s analysis are very fruitful and suggestive, and show
a significant and concrete grasp of the meaning of potenti-
ality, but again the paper is not concerned with the funda-
mental metaphysical implications of the category.
Possibility
,
a University of California publication,
is a work worthy of its place in the excellent series of
philosophic volumes released by this institution. Being of
composite authorship several strands of thought are found in
this book. Though much of the book is concerned with the
logical aspects of possibility, the articles by Adams ( "What
Makes Possibility Possible"), Loewenberg ("Possibility and
Context"), Strong ("The Possible and the Actual"), and Pepper
("A Contextualis tic Theory of Possibility") have significant
metaphysical interest. They all profess an empirical approach.
Loewenberg and Pepper emphasize the part played by the total
127 Art. (1936).
13. Ibid., 25.
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8context in creating possibilities. Strong emphasizes the
potentialities of the members of the context. Adams sees
possibilities in the reneatability of the universal. This
green patch is an actuality, but green is a possibility for
any number of patches. The ultimate metaphysical implications
of these interesting analyses are not considered, however.
Hartmann^ claims that in the realm of being the possi-
ble, the real, and the necessary are identical. But the
temporal forms of our experience and the limitations of the
human mind create the situation where we have the possible
and the actual and the necessary, since there is no onto-
logical possibility and no reality to time, the metaphysical
aspects of potentiality are eliminated, for potentiality is
only a phenomenon.
A study in the bearings of possibility on the philoso-
phy of religion, miracles, free will, etc. is provided by
Verweyen.15 The metaphysical side is not especially con-
sidered. He is positivistic. The category is analyzed in
relation to different fields of thought.
Baumgardt-^ criticizes the theory of possibility
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9from the Kantian standpoint. Meinong, 17 Pichler, 18 Gallinger19
are the phenomenologists he criticizes. In phenomenology
objects are " Soseiende fl (thus-being) or a characterized
something whether existent or not. 20 Possibility is thus
what can belong to the unity of an object, and impossibility
is what cannot belong to the unity of an object. f,Es muss
die Identifikation des Vierecks mit dem runden Ding
hinzutreten, damit etwas Unm'ogliches gedacht wird." 8 ^ All
this is related to Kant’s "real” possibility, but is not
fruitful metaphysically, however rich it may be in description.
The Scholastics make much use of the notion of potenti-
ality, but though the notion is used by them, they do not
offer very penetrating critical analyses of the concept.
Their main concern is to show that phenomena can be explained
by the notions of actus and potentia . A hierarchical system,
a realm of Essence, and the notion of substance are the other
ingredients of the system. Van Roo22 gives a typical presen-
tation of the Scholastic system. He does so from the point
17. MUW.
18. MOW.
19. POM.
20. Baumgardt, DM, 14.
21. Pichler, MOW, 10.
22. Art. (1940).
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of view of potentiality, so is relevant for this inquiry.
Reality is divided into a hierarchy. Being occupies the top
realm. Essence occupies the next lower realm. Particulars
n'z
occupy the realm below Essence. u The realm of Being is the
realm of God, the realm of Essence may be called the realm of
universals or forms, and the realm of particulars is the realm
of space and time. Potency is the principle of limitation.
"All the perfection comes from the side of the act; all the
limitation, from the 3ide of the potency."^4 Now Being is
act, and matter is pure potency; or God is pure perfection
and matter is pure limitation. Now in the hierarchy it is
the principle of limitation that can break up unity into
multiplicity, and the principle of limitation (or potency)
for each realm is its subordinate realm. Thus Essence
breaks up Being into many Forms, and matter breaks up Forms
into many particulars "here and now."^ 6
A presentation of a more dynamic aspect of the
Scholastic theory of potentiality is given by Dubray^ 7 (for
whom potentiality means aptitude to change, or the presence
23. Ibid., 3f
.
24. Ibid., 2.
25. Ibid., 3.
26. Ibid., 4.
Catholic Encyclopedia
.
"Actus and Fotentia."27.
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po
of the germ to be evolved) and Edward M. O’Connor, ° who
tries to fit modem physical theories of energy into the
Scholastic definition of potentiality. Potentiality for him,
is "a power in existing things, to do or to become something
not yet actual" (p.36).
Much has been written on the question of probability
and possibility29 from the point of view of symbolic logic.
But this aspect is beyond the scope of this inquiry, and so
will not be dealt with.
In addition to these definite studies on the problems
of possibility and potentiality, there are references to po-
tentiality in many works on metaphysics.^9 To many of these
we shall refer as the investigation proceeds, but none gives
a separate and detailed study of the metaphysical aspects of
potentiality.
IV. ORGANIZATION OF REMAINDER OF TEE THESIS
After this definition of the field of inquiry, and a
brief review of recent works on potentiality and possibility,
the next step in the investigation is to consider four phi-
28 ". PEE.
29. E.g., Kattsoff, Art. (1937).
30. Whitehead, Bowne, Bradley, are some examples here.
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losophers who have made significant contributions to the
subject. The philosophers to be considered are: Aristotle,
who gave the concept of potentiality its classic exposition;
Kant, who shows the meaning of Moglichkei
t
for Critical Phi-
losophy; Hegel, who shows the meaning of Moglichkeit in the
Dialectical Philosophy; and V/hitehead, whose system makes
extensive use of the concept.
The selection of these four men, is, as any selection
must necessarily be, somewhat arbitrary. Yet we have been
guided by a principle, the principle of relevancy to modern
thought. These four men conform to the spirit of modern
thought. Aristotle and Hegel are philosophers of process and
becoming. Their philosophies are concrete and organic, and
so is the spirit of much modern philosophy. Kant's Critical
Philosophy v/ith its emphasis on, and practically discovery of,
the constitutive activity of thought, gave modern philosophic
thought a new orientation, and so deserves a place in this
investigation. Whitehead is perhaps the greatest living
Anglo-American philosopher.
By the same principle of relevancy to modern thought,
we have omitted from this inquiry any special treatment of
the place of potentiality in the philosophy of the Middle
Ages. The subject was of primary importance for the Middle
Ages, but the spirit of its philosophy is alien to our own.
An analysis of Aristotle's contribution to the subject will
give the essence of the pertinent contributions that the phi-
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13
losophy of the Middle Ages may have made. Again other phi-
losophers, such as Spinoza and Leibnitz, have dealt with
possibility, and though they have given metaphysical appli-
cations to their treatment, 31 still they have treated possi-
bility in its logical meaning, as opposed to necessity and
impossibility, rather than in the sense of potentiality as
defined for this inquiry.
The chapter on Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Whitehead,
will also include a section on the status of the category of
potentiality in various fields of modern thought. The third
chapter will give a critical definition of potentiality, will
consider some related concepts, and show some of the diffi-
culties in the notion. The last two chapters will consider
some further metaphysical implications of the category.
31. Spinoza, claiming that all that is truly possible
must also be necessary, ends up with determinism; Leibnitz
defends possibility in order to save God’s freedom.
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CHAPTER II
POTENTIALITY FROM ARISTOTLE TO WHITEHEAD
INTRODUCTION
This chapter aims to present an interpretation of the
general principles, rather than a minute and thorough expo-
sition of the details of the view of potentiality held by
Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Whitehead. A thorough exposition
would require an analysis of all the writings of these men.
This inquiry, however, limits itself to those works that have
considerable sections on potentiality. The reason for this
is that the main problem of this study is not Aristotle, Kant,
Hegel, nor Whitehead, but potentiality itself. These men are
studied for whatever light they may shed on the problem. The
treatment of Aristotle will be limited to the Metaphysics
,
that of Kant to the Critique of Pure Reason
,
that of Hegel
to the smaller Logic
,
that of Whitehead to Process and Reality .
A brief analysis of the present status of the category, will
complete the chapter.
I. ARISTOTLE
Aristotle gave the concept of potentiality its classic
expression, so a study of the subject may profitably begin
with him.
1. POTENTIALITY AS A UNIFYING PRINCIPLE
Aristotle’s primary interest lay in the world of
— —
.
.
.
_
.
.
.
15
concrete experience. To explain this world in all its
concreteness and in all its richness of variety and process,
he had to investigate universals, first principles, and
primary causes, but the object of his quest was always to
gain knowledge of the particulars. "It is clear that we must
obtain knowledge of the primary causes, because it is when we
think that we understand its primary cause that we claim to
know each particular thing."-*- All metaphysical investigation,
then, has for its aim the knowledge of particulars.
Plato said that philosophy cannot deal with the
changing, perishing, concrete things, since the changing thing
cannot be known. Knowledge is only of the permanent, and so
philosophy must deal with the universal, the permanent.
^
Aristotle admits that knowledge must be of the universal and
permanent, and that philosophy deals with this type of
'Z
knowlege,^ but these universals and permanencies must be
1. Met., I,iii,l(983a, 24ff.).
2. E.g., Theae tetus
.
183. "If nothing is at rest,
every answer upon whatever subject is equally right." This
may not have been Plato’s final thought, but it is Aristotle’s
interpretation of Plato and so will be accepted for the
purposes of this study. That this interpretation of Plato is
to be attributed to Aristotle is evident by the fact that in
Me_h, I,vi,2(987b, 6f
. ) Aristotle has Plato claim that
there can be no general definition of sensible things which
are always changing."
3. Met
. ,
I,ii,4(982a, 22ff.). "The knowledge of
everything must necessarily belong to him who in the highest
degree possesses knowledge of the universal ( 19 0 t/ )
because he knows in a sense all the particulars which it
comprises .
"
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truly descriptive of the particulars or they do not give us
knowledge of the particulars. He believes that Plato's theory
of Forms is not descriptive of particulars. For one thing
the theory of Forms is a static theory and so cannot describe
the dynamic universe of changing things, and so knowledge of
these Forms is of "no help towards the knowledge of other
things."4
If changeable particulars are to be known at all, they
must be known as they are, in all their changeability and
becoming. They must be known as changing because changeabili-
ty is part of their nature, and things can never be known
until they are known as they are. But how can the changeable
be known, for it was admitted that knowledge is of the uni-
versal and permanent? The changing things can be known only
5if they contain something permanent and universal. Can any-
thing universal and permanent be found in changing particular
things? Clearly it cannot be a static princiole or it would
not be descriptive of change. To meet the requirement of
permanence, it must be a unifying principle, unifying into
one abiding whole (or identity; a stream of change. To meet
the requirement of truly describing changing things, it must
be a dynamic principle, a principle applying to a flux and not
T. Met.
.
I,ix,9(991a, Ilf.).
5. Met
., Ill , iv, 1( 999a, 28ff.;. "We acquire our
knowledge of all things only in so far as they contain
something universal, some one and identical characteristic."
* ’
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to a static state. To meet the requirement of universality
principle to be found?
Aristotle implies that it is to be found in the concepts
of potentiality and actuality. These two concepts cover the
history of a thing in all its aspects. In fact these two
concepts are just different aspects of one and the same
process, the process is seen to be one only as it is viewed
from these tv/o aspects. The unity is also shown in the fact
that the two aspects imply one another. Potentiality by its
very meaning points towards actuality, and an existing state
is called an actuality in reference to its potentiality.
to know both the potentiality and actuality of a thing
is to know the whole thing genetically. Thus it is that
Aristotle claims that potentiality and actuality are two ways
of understanding being. "The senses of being are analysable
. . . also in accordance with potentiality and actuality."^
In other words, potentiality and actuality form part of the
very essence of a thing. That is, potentiality and actuality
are not qualities a thing may have, but are aspects of being
proper. A thing does not have potentiality, it is potentiality
(is potentially a definite kind of being). Likewise, a thing
does not have actuality, it is actuality (is a definite kind
of being in actuality)
.
it must apply to all things. Where is such a
6. Met., IX, i , 2( 1045b, 33f.).
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Since a thing is both actuality and potentiality, then the
thing is both what it is and what it may become. Thus the
thin" is a concrete process taken as a whole. A thin? is a
history. The beginning of that history is potentiality rela-
tive to its end. The end of that history is actuality rela-
tive to its beginning. he potential aspect and the actual
aspect of that history gathers up both ends of the process
and makes it one, giving it unity and. identity. Consecuently
the changing thing can be known.
To know a thing in potentiality is to know its power,
its Su l/'&yus (the Aristotelian word for potentiality;. To
) S
know a thing in actuality is to know it in CXTLyZ-XC'
(complete reality) and inCrcpyz/*- (activity.) 7 Actuality
then is the revelation of a thing's power ( f> ^ ' S ) both
> / jby what it does (C^cA* ]/£/<* ) and by what it becomes (C 1/ T
£
1) . Thus C (S
€>Py&(ix. may be considered as the actuality
of the process of becoming and C as the climax of the
7. Met., IX, ill, 10( 1047a, 36f
. ) .
" To <7 To £c $T • '
OyjK £ <r o tr u- Tovi/ y*f> U Au
ol/T&r tre/*. t<rw' ot/K cm <fc' hi ovk Wti^
("This is because, although these things do not exist actually,
they will exist actually; for some non-existent things exist
potentially: yet they do not exist, because they do not exist
in complete reality.' 1 ). , , ,
Here both and £^£ P/£ / ^ are used for actu-
ality, Put obviously c !/ 7x 1 £
1
w (complete reality), supgests
the final stage of actualization (the root of £ t'Y'z-A
€
/ £
seems to be T c X os , end, or last stage), whereas £ ^ dT'/c /c*
is actuality in the sense that the actual is what is active.
Puller (HGP:A,o5) suggests that "entelechv" is the activity
of maintaining an attained actuality, as distinguished from
the
€
irsTp yituL
.
(activity) involved in attaining it.
i.
'
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process. Yet both are actuality in reference to So >
for obviously both the process and the final stage must have
been within the thing’s power of becoming or they would not
have become what they became nor in the manner they became.
; —
There is a sense in which is the connecting link
t' ) i S
between 6° and tl/Tifs £ X but this is true only in
an abstract way. The truth is that this can be-
) /
come this Tc^t XZY'*- only by being present, actualized,
in the whole process of this zucpy^t^ f for indeed this
S / S’
is the activity of this and thus may
truly be called its actuality.
The complete reality of a thing is what it becomes
when it reaches the climax of its development. In a sense
j r
to know this A^te/ac is to know the thing, for to know
a thing in its climactic expression is to know that thing at
its best. Yet there is a difference betv/een a climactic ex-
pression and a complete expression. The climactic expression
is a stage in a process. In a sense it contains the complete
process, but only implicitly. The complete expression em-
braces the climatic expression and the process, and does so
not implicitly but explicitly. Thus the complete actuality
of a thing is both its climactic expression and its process
of actualization .8 The conclusion of this interpretation is
8. To be sure Aristotle is pot always exact in his
terminology and so at times he uses CPZpyt/cL in the sense of
t/w (so Tredennick, Met
., Intro, xxix), but in spite
of this, the fact that he does use these tv/o terms justifies
the interpretation here given.
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that to know a thing then is to know not only its £- 1/ pE. \LKL/K
but also its process and its potentiality.
But how can a process be known? Knowledge is of the
permanent and the identical, whereas process by its very
nature is change and flow. The potentiality may be known and
so may the entelechy, but not the process. But in so far as
points towards ^ ^ < 7 " f then it is obvious
' that this process has a definite goal. It is not mere flow,
but flow in a definite direction, towards a definite goal.
In a word it is a vector, and so has meaning (directional
meaning), and so has identity (directional identity); as such
it may be known.
9
What does it mean to know the potentiality of a thing?
Clearly, only as it becomes actuality can it be known. A po-
tentiality is an actuality viewed in retrospect. Potentiality
is an aspect of actuality, and the potentiality of a thing
can be concretely knov.-n only in relation to its actuality.
"The formula and knowledge of the actual must precede the
knowledge of the potential."'1'0 To know the potentiality of
a thing, then, can only mean that the thing’s actuality is
9. For example H2O has one vector from ice to steam
and another from steam to ice. Each one of these vectors can
be known as such, though of course the concrete knowledge both
of their various phases and of the starting points and goals
of each would be needed to really know what the nature of H2Ois. Of course Aristotle did not develop these implications
of his terms, but this elaboration is consistent with his
thought.
10. Met ., IX, viii,3( 1049b, 16f.)
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already known. We know that HgO is ice in potentiality,
because we know the nature of the actuality, ice. Had ice
never been known, then it would never have been known that
HgO may take the form of ice.
But this cannot be the whole story, for a potentiality
may never become an actuality. "A thing may be capable of
being and yet not be.”11 This arrested potentiality is real,
though, due to its frustration, it will never become actual.
Thus an acorn may never become an oak and still be a potential
oak in a true sense. In this sense a potentiality is only a
possibility. To deny potentiality as a possibility is to
identify potentiality with actuality. 12 That is the error of
the Megaric school "who say that a thing only has potency
when it functions
The truth of the matter seems to be that a thing must
have potency (i.e. possibility of becoming), or it cannot have
directional process, vectors. The actualization of that
potency may be frustrated for any number of reasons, yet the
potency is there. What that potency is in detail can be known
only if it is actualized, but that there is a potency, even if
never actualized, must be asserted. To the question "how can
what is unknown be asserted?" the answer is that the assertion
TlT Met., IX, iii,7( 1047a, 21f.).
12. Met., IX, iii, 7(1047, 18ff.).
13. Ibid., IX, iii,l( 1046b, 29f.). On the Aristotelian
treatment of "possibility" cf. V,xii,10.
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is a matter of coherent faith. There is as much justification
for asserting that this acorn is a potential oak (meaning that
under the proper circumstances it will become an oak), as
there is for asserting that if this acorn rolls off the table
it will fall down, though it would be impossible to predict
just where it would fall. It is still true that potentiality
has meaning only in reference to actuality, that is, that
potential change can be asserted only because actual change
has been experienced, but once the discovery of the principle
of potentiality has been made it can be rationally asserted
of a thing whenever reason and experience justify the assertion.
In a world of temporal experiences change is real, and potenti-
ality means just this ability of a thing to undergo change,
for "potency is the source of change.” 14 How that source is
to be metaphysically conceived, is, of course, the problem of
this study.
2. PRIORITY OF ACTUALITY
The Identity of changing things, then, is provided by
the two concepts of potentiality and actuality. When a thing
is known from both these aspects, it is known as a unity, a
process, and a concrete particular. But to know the potenti-
ality of a thing it is necessary to know the actuality it may
become. Thus in a sense the actuality must be prior to the
potentiality. Now Aristotle contends that this is true not
14. Met., IX,i,4(l046a, 10;
.r f " . ’ '.C ‘1 C 1
•
,
3 r. . I ' J
'
•
'
'
? o Le.'i or e r -o ><f
.
.
'
.
'
: to
RftjB t Iu9*£ al e- nX
.
.
eaisjoe 8
.
.
.
rtf «a
.
c. • C'
*
‘
.
*
«•
.
•
; : r ' J
'
.
-4
- # -* 0C~ ;
.
.
.
. t . t . __ •
23
only in an epistemic sense, but in a real sense as well. In
fact it is true in several senses. 18 Now priority has
several meanings. 16 Aristotle tries to show that the actual
is prior to the potential formally, substantially, and in a
certain sense even temporally. That actuality is formally
prior to potentiality is evident from the previous discussion.
The potential cannot be defined (as to content) except as we
define the actual. It is possible to think of an acorn as a
potential oak only if the oak is thought of. But actuality
is prior to potentiality in a deeper sense also, says
Aristotle
.
Without going into the various meanings of substanti-
ality for Aristotle, it seems clear that by substantial
priority18 he means the pull of the ideal of perfection upon
individual things. It is a teleological and perfectionistic
viewpoint of becoming as opposed to determinism and mechanism.
Thus animals have eyes that they may see, and do not see in
order to have eyes. 18 In so far as the true essence of a
thing is to be found in the thing* s purpose, or goal, it
follows that since this goal is the final cause of the thing's
becoming, then this goal is causally prior to the potentiality.
15. Met .. IX,viii. This whole chapter is devoted to
this theory, and there are other passages as will be soon shown.
16. Met., V,xi.
17. Met., IX, viii,2( 1049b, 13f.).
18. Met., IX,viii,8ff( 1050a, 3ff.;.
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and so the essence of a thing (or its form; is prior to its
potentiality. In simpler terms, potentiality implies an end,
and the end cannot be any end but a definite end. But a defi-
nite end must be an actual end. In what sense an end not yet
realized can control the process of its own realization
Aristotle takes up under the theory of the prime mover.
As to temporal priority the field is divided. In one
sense the actual is prior, in another the potential is prior.
Take a thing by itself and potentiality is temporally prior to
actuality, ’’The individual actuality is posterior in gener-
ation to its potentiality.”20 In fact a potentiality may
never become an actuality, as we saw above. 2^ Nevertheless
the potentiality must be a reality or the actuality would
never come about. The potentiality must have being in some
sense. If it be merely a concept it can never account for
process. The fact that an acorn is a potential oak rather
than a potential pup, means that the oak must be in the acorn
in some sense, for only thus can it become an oak or, to use
one of Aristotle’s illustrations, the learner can learn
because even before he learns he possesses ’’something of the
IT. Met., IX,viii,2(l049b, 13f.), and 4ff.
20. Met., IX, ix, 5 (1051a, 32ff.).
21. Cf
.
ibid.. Ill, vi , 6( 1003a, If.) ’’The potential
need not necessarily always become actual.”
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science.
"
22 But the seed (as potentiality) can possess these
tendencies only because there was a prior actuality that
imparted them to it. "Prior in time to these potential
entities are other actual entities from which the former are
generated." 23 This actual oak was potentially in that seed
because it was produced by a previous actual oak.
The temporal priority of actuality to potentiality in
the above sense is true not only in the case of organic gener-
ation, but of the universe as a whole . In fact the movement
from potentiality to actuality in a particular thing can be
explained only as we see the particular against its cosmic
background. "In point of time . . . one actuality presup-
poses another right back to that of the prime mover.
"
2^ As
a result, though potentiality seems to be prior, and in the
history of a particular thing taken by itself it is prior,
yet the world could never come about were not actuality the
fundamental factor of the universe. If potentiality Is prior
"there can be no reality; for everything may be capable of
existing, but not yet existent. "^5 a principle whose essence
is actuality is needed to set potentiality in motion. It
must be an eternal actuality. Since the world has always
existed, generation and destruction must be explained by a
22 ~. Met., IX,viii,7(1050a, If.).
23. Met., IX, vi i i , 5 ( 1049b , 23f.).
24. Met., IX,viii,14(1050b, 4); cf. also XII, vi, 5.
25. Met., XII,vi,5( 1071b, 26f.).
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Pfi
theory of cyclic change. Disregarding Aristotle's astronomic
speculations for the present, it may be stated that the princi-
ple of actuality which explains the cycle, setting it and
sustaining it in motion, is the prime mover, "which moves
without being moved." This unmoved mover can cause motion
without itself moving because it is the object of desire, the
object towards which the whole creation strives. It is com-
plete actuality, complete rest. 27
The theory of the Prime Mover will be considered
later. Here it is well to restate some of the more signifi-
cant principles of Aristotle’s doctrine of potentiality.
(l) Potentiality and actuality are different aspects of the
same "thing". (2) Potentiality is known only through its
actuality. (3) The potentiality of a thing is the thing’s
possibility of becoming. It is thus a thing’s power,
iui/uH(S
. (4) But this power is definite and actual, or it
would never become. (5) Thus actuality is prior to potentiality.
Potentiality is actuality’s function in becoming. (6) Actuality
is the fundamental factor of the universe. (7) The Prime
Mover is complete actuality. Aristotle thus considers po-
tentiality from the epistemic aspect (points 1 and 2 above),
from the metaphysical aspect (points 6 and 7), and as a
definite power in a particular "thing" (points 3,4,5).
26. Met., XII,vi,9(l072a, 7ff.).
27. Met., XII , vii,2( 1072a, 23ff.)
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Paradoxical as it may seem, in this latter aspect potentiality
is itself an actuality. It is a fau actually present
in the thing. It is real, not a mere aspect of the "thing"
.
3. FORM AND MATTER
So far potentiality has been considered from the
point of view of process, the development of organisms being
the best illustration of this aspect of potentiality. Aristotle,
however, looked upon the world not only dynamically but also
statically. When he explained things statically he substituted
the terms form and matter for actuality and potentiality
respectively. The relationship between potentiality and
actuality thus takes on a different aspect. Potentiality is
to actuality as matter is to form. Now a thing is both matter
and form, "for that which is generated will always have to be
. .
.
partly matter and partly form." 28 The form of a thing
is its definition, its organization, also its function. The
matter of a thing is its constituent part or stuff.
Hence in defining the nature of a house, those who
describe it as stones, bricks and wood describe the po-
tential house, since these things are its matter; those
who describe it as 'a receptacle for containing goods
and bodies*.
. . describe its actuality." 2
But matter and form always exist together, for him, as
28.
29
Met.. VII, viii,4( 1033b, 12ff.)
Met.. VIII , ii,8( 1043a, 15ff.).
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far as finite things are concerned. Form exists In the object
and matter exists in the object. They are distinguishable in
thought only, not in reality. Matter, for Aristotle, is not
the "matter" of the materialists, but a relational term.
Matter Is something out of which something else is composed.^0
It is not one homogeneous stuff, but what can receive further
determinations. Thus wood is matter for a door, and door is
matter for a house. Or, to use another illustration, hay is
matter for cow, cow is matter for meat, meat is matter for man,
man is matter for the state. From one point of view a thing
is form, from another point of view it is matter. A piece of
steel as such is a particular form (actuality;, but it is also
matter for a sword. Thus there is a hierarchy of matter and
form. The more indeterminate a thing is the more "matter"
and the less "form" it i_s (not has). The more determinate a
thing is the less "matter" and the more "form" it is. Thus
at one end is complete inde termination or ultimate matter.
At the other end is complete determination or pure form. But
ultimate matter as complete inde termination Is non-existent.
It is a mere abstraction, for all exi stents must have some
31form. Pure form as complete determination, on the other
hand, exists. It is God, the Prime Mover, the perfect being
lacking no determination, no actuality. From this point of
30. Met., VII,vii, 2( 1032a, 16ff.;.
3!. Met., IX, vii , 5-7 ( 1049a, 25ff.); Fuller, HGP : A , 62
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view matter is a retarding element, the negation of form, but
it is also the principle of individuation. It makes the
difference between a bronze Hermes and a wooden one.
The interweavings of all these various strands in
Aristotle’s conception of matter is beyond the scope of this
study, as is also any attempt to reconcile their contradictory
implications . One contribution of all this to the conception
of potentiality is that from the static point of view potenti-
ality as matter is passive, whereas from the dynamic point
of viev/ potentiality is active. Matter being what can receive
further determination, potentiality becomes the capacity to
receive determinations. The v/ood receives the form of Hermes
that the sculptor carves from it. The wood does nothing
beyond receiving. It is potential only in the sense that it
can be worked upon in certain ways. It may also be conceived
as a negative potentiality in the sense that it rejects all
determinations it cannot receive.
For Aristotle, moreover, passive and active seem to be
relative terms. Matter is passive, but matter is also a
cause "the principle in the patient itself v/hich initiates
a passive change in it by the action of some other thing."''
Pure passivity is nothing, but potentiality as material cause
32. Met
.
,
IX, i, 5- 9 (1046a, 11-35)
33. Loc . cit., 1046a, 12ff
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is something. It is the element of individuation, of
54
concretion. Thus a saw cannot be generated from wood.'
Matter is the proximate cause and constitutes the difference
between a wooden Hermes and a marble Hermes. (The material
35
cause is the proximate matter and not primary matter.)'"
Potentiality is thus the principle of concretion.
The statical view is responsible for the hierarchical
conception of the world, rather than the evolutionary. Po-
tentiality as process refers to the development of things,
especially organisms, as such. Potentiality as matter con-
siders the relation of things to other members in the hierarchy
of existents, from the most "material’' existent to Pure Form,
or God. Pure Form, the logical demand of a completed hierarchy
of matter and form, provides the universal final cause for all
becoming, and so is the explanation of the dynamic view as
well
.
Another distinction between the dynamic view and the
static view of potentiality, is the difference between
immanent teleology and external purpose. Organisms, as the
best example of dynamic potentiality, have immanent teleology.
Artifacts, as the best example of the static conception of
potentiality, are products of external purpose. "Art is a
generative principle in something else; nature is a generative
34. Me t
.
,
VIII , iv,3( 1044a, 28ff.J
35. Loc
. cit. 5( 1044a, 34ff.).
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principle in the subject itself (for man begets man).” 36
The development of the acorn is due to immanent teleology,
but the production of Hermes requires the four causes; material,
efficient, formal, and final, the final cause being the pur-
pose in the sculptor’s mind. The wood is a potential Hermes,
but it takes both the purposing and the agency (efficient
cause) and the conceiving (formal cause) of the sculptor to
produce the actual Hermes. External agency and external
purpose are needed to actualize the potentiality of an
artifact to be.
4. PRIME MOVER AND POTENTIALITY
This study has shown that potentiality from the point
of view of development is a function of actuality, and that
it is an immanent and telic function. Potentiality statically
considered is a "passive” capacity requiring an external agent
to actualize it. From the dynamic point of view the Prime
Mover is pure actuality and the goal of all becoming; from
the statical point of view he is pure form and the apex of
the pyramidical hierarchy of existents. Logically he is de-
manded by the hierarchical conception; dynamically he serves
as the cause of becoming, since all becoming is a movement
from potentiality to actuality. In this sense he is the final
cause, the unmoved mover. But what is the ultimate efficient
36. Met., XII,iii,2( 1070a, 7ff.)
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cause, for a final cause depends on efficient cause to attain
its goal?
That the movement from potentiality to actuality needs
an efficient cause seems to be recognized by Aristotle. This
ultimate efficient cause must be a complete reality, the first
of all things, for "that which is first of all things moves
37
all things." This is stated in a section where he is speak-
ing of efficient causes. Again Aristotle rejects the infinite
regress for "if there is no first term there is no cause at
7Q
all." ' The priority of actuality also shows that an actual
reality is needed to initiate movement. The Prime Mover is
such a reality, for "that which is first in complete reality
is the cause of all things."^9 But how does this efficient
cause work? "Unless a cause actually functions, there will
be no motion, yet the Prime Mover is unmoved. Aristotle
tries to meet this by an appeal to celestial mechanics.
Stars have souls. These souls desire God and to attain per-
fect actuality. To do so they start the celestial bodies
rotating. The movement of one sphere affects motion in all
spheres. The rotation of the sun controls generation on the
W. Met., XII,iv,8(l070b, 34f.).
38. Met., II,ii,4( 994a, 19f.).
39. Met., XII, v,6( 1071a, 35f.).
. Met., XII,vi,3(l071b, 19).40
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41
earth. The Prime Mover is thus the final cause and the
heavenly souls (stars) are the efficient cause of generation.
Although such a view reconciles the demands of final causation
and efficient causation, it does so by sacrificing the tele-
ology of things on this earth. As far as this earth is con-
cerned it is mechanically determined by the rotation of the
sun. The penetrating organic and telic aspects of becoming
are next to obliterated, if we consider the above interpre-
tation as ultimate. On the other hand to consider all be-
coming as an unconscious immanent desire in things to attain
full actuality is not very illuminating. What does uncon-
scious desire mean? Can any meaning be attached to uncon-
scious purpose? On the basis of this study it seems that
the telic view is, in spite of its difficulty, truer to the
genius of Aristotle. Certainly this is so on the basis of
the Metaphysics
.
But on either view the Prime Mover has lost
contact with the world, though the world has not lost contact
with him. He is neither an immanent efficient cause nor a
transcendent efficient cause. Under these circumstances
Aristotle either appeals to an unconscious desire of things
to attain greater actuality and less potentiality (his usual
view), or to an efficient causation by celestial souls and
its accompanying mechanistic causation. Thus all efficient
41. Ross, ARI, 181.
J i
, U , - •, • j.
• *
. •.
'*•
'
• •: 1 • af
• r ;
7 *
'
' :
...
• •
'
’
'
•
'
: a :
34
causation is on the pant of the world in one sense or the
other. This reduces to the strange paradox that actuality
(Prime Mover) does nothing, whereas potentiality (the material
world) does everything.
Again, all generation presupposes matter or po-
tentiality. But pure potentiality is an abstraction (as is
pure matter) • Reality can neither be built up from, nor
limited by, abstractions. Since actuality is the metaphysical
ultimate (Prime Mover) and is prior to potentiality, then
whence the potentiality of things, for abstractions, as was
said, neither build up nor limit realities? Potentiality is
often referred to as a limitation of actuality, but how did
such a limitation come about in the first place since actuality
is prior to potentiality? In one passage Aristotle seems to
suggest that the Prime Mover is the cause of infinite po-
tentiality T, for it causes motion for infinite time and
nothing finite has infinite potentiality. 1,42 The meaning,
however, is not absolutely clear and being the only reference
to such a thought it must not be pressed too far, especially
since it does not harmonize with the idea of the Unmoved
Mover. The Prime Mover is unmoved and undeveloping, and
ultimate potentiality (pure potentiality, pure matter) is an
abstraction, thus whence the power of development? Aristotle
recognizes that we need the concept of potentiality in order
42. Met., XII , vii , 12 ( 1073a
,
3ff.)
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to show that change is not haphazard, but he gives no satis-
factory account either of the metaphysical basis of potenti-
ality or of its metaphysical implications. In view of his
excellent analysis of the concept in nature, this lack is
all the more regretable, (The Prime Mover, of course, is the
metaphysical ultimate of actuality.)
II . KANT
From the epistemic point of view potentiality is the
aspect of a developing thing in prospect, and actuality is
the aspect of that thing in retrospect or in the present.
This inquiry has shown that the epistemic approach is to be
found in Aristotle. Kant, who first made a thorough critical
investigation of the knowledge situation, deals with the
epistemic meaning of possibility. There are characteristic
differences between his treatment and that of Aristotle.
Kant does not deal with potentiality as such but with the
larger problem of possibility ( Moglichkeit ) . Aristotle looked
on potentiality as a way of defining things. An individual
thing is not defined until it is defined both in its potenti-
alities and in its actualities. In dealing with modal possi-
bility Kant was not interested in the potentialities of a
thing as such, but rather in the epistemic meaning of the
term "possible thing." That is, Kant's problem was to show
the epistemic differences in knowledge situations where a
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thing is known as a possibility, as an actuality, or as a
necessity respectively. A more detailed statement of all
this will be found in the section "Real Possibility." All
that needs to be emnhasized here is that with Kant Moglichkei
t
is an epistemic term. It does not refer to the objective po-
tentiality of things, nor to objective possibility as such,
but to what is implied subjectively when a knower entertains
a thing as possible rather than as actual. In other words,
how do the conditions of a knowledge situation in which a
thing is entertained as possible differ from the conditions
of a knowledge situation in which a thing is entertained as
actual? The point is that the difference is not objective
(in nature), but in the knowledge situation. The categories
of modality "only express the relation of the concept to the
faculty of knowledge." 43
This inquiry will consider Kant's treatment of
possibility ( Moglichkei
t
) under four headings: (1) Logical
Possibility, (2) Real Possibility, (3) Absolute Possibility,
(4) Kant and Potentiality.
1. LOGICAL POSSIBILITY
By logical possibility (also called analytical possi-
bility) Kant means a concept that "does not contradict itself 44
43. KrV, B266. (Kemp Smith's translation used
throughout.)
44 KrV, B302.
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Such a concept is logically possible because it is logically
thinkable. A concept which contradicts itself is nothing and
so is impossible.^ Now the question is, what is the relation
between logically tenable concepts and reality? Kant is
primarily interested not in possible concepts but in possible
things. Is a thing possible merely because its concept is
possible? "It is, indeed, a necessary logical condition
that a concept of the possible must not contain any contra-
diction" but is this "sufficient to determine the objective
reality of the concept" ?^® Kant thinks not. Philosophy is
not a matter of wild speculation, but an attempt to rationally
interpret the world of experience. If it limits the possible
to the logically consistent, it does so because only what is
logically consistent can have any meaning for us. In other
words our rational make-up is the criterion of intelligible
possibility. Now Kant, consciously or unconsciously, takes
this principle and applies it a step further. Since we are
not only rational beings, but have also immanent principles
by which we construct experience out of the given, then the
possible is a "real possibility" for us when it conforms not
only to our rational laws, but also to the conditions of our
having experience at all. For us to talk of possible things
45. KrV, B348
46. KrV, B268
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(not concepts) which could never possibly come within our
experience for a priori reasons, is as barren as to talk of
possible concepts which we could never logically think.
"Real possibility,” then, limits and surpasses analytical
possibility.
2. REAL POSSIBILITY
Logical possibility is the thinkable. Real possibility
is the experienceable . The category of possibility, then, as
distinguished from logical possibility^ applies only to what
may enter the field of experience. "The employment of the
categories can never extend further than the objects of ex-
perience." 47 This means that logical possibility applies to
concepts, but real possibility applies to the objects of con-
cepts or "things."
For if they, the modal categories, are not to have a
purely logical significance, analytically expressing the
form of thought
,
but are to refer to the possibility,
actuality, or necessity of things
,
they must concern
possible experience and its synthetic unity, in which
alone objects of knowledge can be given. 4^
In other words the concept is a real possibility if it refers
to a possible thing. A concept is a logical possibility if
it is thinkable inon-contradictory ) whether its object is
possible or not.
47.
48.
KrV, B308
; cf. B266f.
KrV, B267
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When is a thing possible? A thing is possible if its
concept is not only logically possible but also in conformity
with the form and condition of experience in general. "The
postualte of the possibility of things requires that the con-
cept of the things should agree with the formal conditions of
experience in general." 49 This means that the concept of a
possible object must conform to the conditions of the "sensi-
bility" and of the "understanding." "That which agrees, in
intuition and in concepts, with the formal conditions of ex-
perience, is possible." 50 In other words the concept of a
possible thing must not only be a consistent concent, but
must conform to the conditions of space, time, and the cate-
gories. SI The concept of a possible thing is thus a
"synthetic" possibility, for "the objective form of experience
in general, contains all synthesis that is required for
knowledge of objects." 50
Now a synthesis, for Kant, means the "act of putting
different representations together, and of grasping what is
manifold in them in one (act of] knowledge." 50
a
Thus the con-
tent of concepts are always synthetic. Analysis cannot take
49~; KrV, B267
.
50. KrV, B265
51. Paton, KME, 341: "We must, I think, take Kant
to mean that an object is possible so far as it conforms,
not only to space and time, but also to the categories."
52. KrV, B267
52a. KrV, B103 (brackets are added by the translator,
Kemp Smi th ) .
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place until the content is given, and the content is given
only by a synthesis, a putting together. "It is to synthesis,
therefore, that we first must direct our attention, if we
would determine the first origin of our knowledge
.
,,525) There
are three elements to any such synthesis:
What must first be given ... is the manifold of pure
intui tion {i .e
.
the forms of space and time}; the second
factor involved is the synthesis of this manifold by means
of the imagination. The concepts which give unity to
this pure synthesis
. . .
furnish the third requisite for
the knowledge of an object; and they rest on the under-
standing. 52c
The condition of all this is the unity of consciousness, what
Kant calls "the synthetic unity of apperception." 555 In the
synthesis of an empirical object, of course, the material
elements of experience (sensations), enter into the content
of the synthesis. The synthesis of these sensations in
accordance with the above factors is an object. "An object
is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given in-
tuition is united." 556 It must be remembered that the syn-
thesis is not "read off," so to speak, but constituted by the
mind. "We cannot represent to ourselves anything as combined
in the object which we have not ourselves previously combined .
"
555
52b. Loc
. cit.
52c. KrV, B104.
52d. KrV, B154
.
52e
. KrV, B137.
KrV,52f
.
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Experience is constituted by synthesizing the given elements
of sensations. How this synthesis can take place is a mystery,
but that it must take place is an a priori necessity. An
object is thus a synthetic possibility if it can be nut to-
gether in accordance with the formal conditions of experience,
i.e., space, time, the categories, and the unity consciousness.
A concept of such an object is a possible concept.
It would seem, then, that any concept which meets the
formal conditions of experience is a concept of a possible
thing. Kant, however, does not rest with this conclusion.
Not all concepts which meet the formal conditions of experience
are concepts of possible things. Fictitious concepts, e.g.
centaurs, that agree with the general conditions of experience
do not have objects. To understand Kant here it seems ad-
viseable to make a distinction between a possible synthetic
concept and a possible thing. A possible synthetic concept
is a concept that conforms to the formal conditions of ex-
perience. Nov/ the question is, need such a synthetic concept
refer to a possible "thing" or not? The concept of a centaur
meets the formal conditions of experience and so is a possible
synthetic concept, but it does not refer to a possible thing
because a possible thing either belongs to experience or is
implied by experience. Thus:
a concept which contains a synthesis is to be regarded
as empty and as not related to any object, if the syn-
thesis does not belong to experience either as being de-
rived from it, in which case it is an empirical concept.
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or as being a priori conditions upon which experience in
general in its formal aspects rests. "5°
Objects of fictitious empirical concepts are consequently,
ruled out. Only what is experienced or implied by exper-
ience is a possible thing. There are, then, three meanings,
so far, of possibility: (l) logical or analytical possibility,
(2) synthetic possibility, (3) possible things.
A possible synthetic concent that does not relate to
objects of experience, or to what is imnlied by experience,
is empty. It is idle to entertain it. But if only those
possible synthetic concepts are to be entertained which re-
late to exnerience, what is the difference between a possible
thing and an actual thing? What is experienced is, of course,
actual, for if experience implies it, experience must deoend
on it and so it must of necessity be actual. Now the word
"imply" has two meanings. It may mean that an effect implies
its cause; or it may mean that a cause implies its effect.
An actuality implies its cause as an actuality, but it implies
its effect as a possibility. That is, the cause of an actu-
ality must be an actuality, but the effect of an actuality
is a possibility Ipotentiali ty) . It would seem, then, that
a possible thing differs from an actuality in that it is im-
plied as an effect of actuality. This is the usual meaning
of "real possibility." It is not, however, the Kantian
53. KrV, B267
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meaning. Kant calls this type of. implication not modal
possibility but necessity:
Necessity concerns only the relations of anpearances in
conformity with the dynamical lav/ of causality and the
possibility grounded upon it of inferring a priori from
a given existence (a cause) to another existence ^ the
effect)
.
What, then, is the difference between a possible thing
and an actual thing, as thing ? The answer is, "no difference."
At first this sounds like a shocking conclusion, for a possible
thing must certainly be different from an actual thing. Kant,
however, insists that the difference is not in the thing :
Through the actuality of a thing I certainly posit more
than the possibility of it, but not in the thing . For
it can never contain more in its actuality than is con-
tained in its complete possibility. But v/hile possibility
is merely a positing of the thing in relation to the
understanding (in its empirical employment), actuality
is at the same time a connection of it v/ith perception. 55
"Real possibility," then, in the Kantian sense, means the
concept of an experienceable thing. That is, the concept of
a thing, as concept, is that thing as possibility. The dis-
tinction between "real possibility" and actuality is, conse-
quently, the distinction between the concept of the thing
54. KrV, B280. The point is that Kant calls the
"possibility" of inferring from causal lav/s "necessity" and
not modal possibility. Modal possibility is thus different
from this other type of possibility (which Kant calls modal
necessity). This point will be developed as the argument
proceeds
.
55. KrV, B287n
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and the thing itself ,55a. The content of the concept, as con-
cept, is the thing as possibility; the content of the thing,
as thing, is the thing as actuality. The content of the two
are, of course, the same. The difference is a difference of
relationship to the knowing mind. The content of a concent
is thought through the understanding ( Verstand ) ; the content
of a thing is known through perception. When a thing is per-
ceived, it is known as an actuality; when its concept 5.3
thought, it is known as a possibility. "For that the concept
precedes the perception signifies the concept’s mere possi-
bility; the perception which supplies the content to the
concept is the sole mark of ac tuality
.
Thus when Kant speaks of "possible things," he does
not refer to things that merely may exist, but are not known
to exist; he refers, rather, to the concent of things that
are to be found in experience. As far as things are concerned
their possibility is attested by their actuality and in no
other way. As Paton states it: "If we know that there are
actual dogs in the world, we know that dogs are possible . ..j
and we cannot know that dogs are possible, except by knowing
that they are actual. But knowing a thing in actuality
is, nevertheless, different from knowing it as possibility.
55a. That is, the phenomenal thing, not The Ding-an-
sich .
55b. KrV, BP77.
56 • Paton, KME,II, 347. Paton, however, does not
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When an object of a possible synthetic concept is thought
about, it is possible. When it is implied by the mechanism
of nature, it is necessary. In fact the mark of actuality
is perception, but the test of actuality is necessity, for a
perception not causally related to the mechanism of nature
is an illusion. An actual thing Is known as an actuality
through perception, but the test of its objective actuality
is its place in t he mechanism of nature,
A possible thing, then, is an actual thing (or what
is consistent v/ith the actual), known conceptually. When it
is known perceptually it is known as actuality. "That which
is bound up with the material conditions of experience, that
Is, with sensation, is actual." 568- It follows that the field
of possibility, for Kant, is no wider than the field of
actuality, as far as the empirical employment of the modal
categories is concerned. The employment of categories beyond
the field of possible experience, Kant, of course, does not
allow. The existence of a thing may, however, be asserted
if it is demanded by other factors in experience, though
(56 cont.) distinctly emphasize that a possible thing is an
actual thing known as concept. The point of the interpretation
here presented is that for Kant modal possibility does not
mean possible inferences drawn from experience, but means,
rather, a particular way of knowing either experience, or
the conditions of experience. The inferences themselves are
not possible but necessary, yet may be known either as
possible (conceptually) or as actual (perceptually).
56a. KrV, B266.
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there is no immediate perception of it. "Thus from the per-
ception of the attracted iron filings we know of the existence
of a magnetic matter [sicp pervading all bodies," though we
cannot see it. 565 It is to be noted, in this connection,
that the objective existence of the thing, though an infer-
ence, is not a possibility, but a fact, for r, the perception
of it can, if need be, precede the concept." 560 The reason
the perception does not do so in the case of "magnetic matter"
is that our senses are limited. "The grossness of our senses
however does not in any way decide the form of possible
experience in general." 565- Magnetic matter is thus ex-
perienceable
,
though not experienced. Since it is experience-
able and demanded by experience it has objective existence.
Subjectively, however, it can be known only as a nossibility.
Should our senses become refined it would be known as actu-
ality. In itself it is actual, not merely possible.
Real possibility, then, as a concept of the under-
standing is limited to experience. It affirms that the object
of the concept is experienceable
.
When experienced, the object
is subjectively actual for the knowing mind. When conceived,
the object is subjectively known as possible. The modal
56b. KrV, B273.
56c
.
KrV, B272
.
56d KrV, B273
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category of possibility, thus, does not judge about the
objective potentialities of things. The possibilities
(potentialities) of actual things are judged by "the princi-
ple of their empirical connection (the analogies ).
"
56e
Because of the determinism of nature these "possibilities"
(inferred by the use of the analogies; are known as neces-
sities (in the modal sense). Objective potentiality is, thus,
modal necessity. Modal possibility is the concept of an ex-
perienceable thing entertained only as concept (not being
perceived)
.
3. ABSOLUTE POSSIBILITY
May not possibility have a wider meaning? May not
the field of possibility be, consequently, larger than the
field of actual! ty?^^^ Kant answers that as far as our human
experience is concerned such possibility is impossible. Such
possibility is thinkable but not knowable (experienceable )
.
To know an object I must be able to prove its possibility,
either from its actuality as attested by experience, or
a priori by means of reason. But I can think whatever
I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself. "56g
The reason is that the conditions of human experience are
what they are, and it is idle to talk of other types of possi-
ble experience. Nothing is possible (in any judicious use of
56e
.
HCrV, B273
.
56f KrV, B282
56g. KrV, Bxxvi ,n
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the word) except what is possible in accordance with the con-
ditions of possible experience. 5611 "Absolute possibility" is
not a problem of the understanding ( Vers tand ) , but of reason
( Vernunf
t
)
.
Reason, however, can make no fruitful use of the
category of possibility. It can form "ideas" that are ana-
lytically (logically) possible, but cannot assert their ex-
istence. The notion of existence cannot be added to a con-
cept as an additional part of its content, for the categories
of modality add nothing to the content of a concent. "They
do not in the least enlarge the concept to which they are
attached as predicates." 5 ^ Reason ( Vernunf
t
) must form the
"idea" of a most perfect Being, but cannot affirm the exist-
ence of this Being. The conceivability of a most perfect
Being does not prove its actuality, for a concept is the
same whether actual or possible. "If we attempt to think
existence through the pure category alone, we cannot specify
57a
a single mark distinguishing it from mere possibility."
The concept of a hundred thalers, for examnle, is the same,
whether the hundred thalers be considered actual or merely
possible
.
Knowledge of the existence of things (and so of their
56h. KrV, B284
.
57. KrV, B266
57a. KrV, B629
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"real” possibility) can be had only from actual experience
or its implications. Such knowledge of the actual is always,
however, a synthetic knowledge. Now "the possibility of
synthetic knowledge is never to be looked for save in ex-
perience."^^ Logical analysis can give the "thinkable,"
but only experience (and its implications), can give the
actual (the synthetically possible). "Ideas" of reason
(Vernunf
t
) are thinkable but not experienceable , and so can
have no synthetic possibility. To put it differently, their
possibility is thinkable but not knowable, and for Kant only
what is knowable (or what are the a priori conditions of the
knowablej is truly possible. The a priori conditions of ex-
perience are, of course, the categories of the Vers tand
,
not
the "ideas" of Vernunf
t
. Thus the field of possibility is
no wider than the field of experience. "Absolute possibility"
is thinkable, but not knowable, and so is of no use in the
interpretation of experience. All efforts expended on
analysing "absolute possibility" are so much "Love’s Labor
Lost.
"
4. KANT AND POTENTIALITY
Real possibility, then, cannot be applied beyond the
realm of experience and its conditions. The difference be-
tween a possible object and an actual object is not in the
57b. KrV, B630
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object, but in its relation to experience. When a "knowable"
object is merely thought, it is possible; when perceived (or
implied in perception) it is actual. Real possibility, thus,
asserts only that an actual object may be subjectively per-
ceived as well as thought about. It asserts nothing of the
objective possibilities (potentialities) of the phenomenal
thing itself. Aristotle was interested in the potentialities
of things. Kant was interested in the different ways a thing
may be known: as possibility (conceptually), as actuality
(perceptually), as necessity (as effect of a cause). If in
knowing an oak we relate it to an acorn as the effect of the
latter, then the oak is known as a necessity. Instead of
speaking of the potentiality of the acorn, Kant speaks of
the oak known under the category of necessity. To say, how-
ever, that the oak is a necessity relative to the acorn is
just another way of saying that the acorn is a potential oak.
Potentiality and necessity are, thus, different v/ays of view-
ing the same process. Considered from the point of view of
the beginning, the process is viewed as potentiality; from
the point of view of the end of the process, it is necessity.
Necessity is potentiality seen in reverse. As such, however,
necessity becomes a theory about the nature of potentiality.
It claims that potentiality can be explained only mechanically.
These conclusions are not drawn by Kant, but are consistent
with his principles. Indeed, if the interpretation of Kant’s
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theory of modal categories here advanced is correct, these
conclusions are implied in Kant.
This interpretation of Kant, furthermore, leads to
the paradoxical conclusion that necessity is related to
objective potentiality, but possibility is not. Since a
"real possibility," for Kant, is only the concert of an ex-
perienceable thing, it asserts nothing, as has been shown,
of the thing’s objective potentiality. There is a sense,
however, in which the Kantian concept of real possibility
involves potentiality. It is not the objective potentiality
of things, but the contextual potentiality of a knowledge
situation. That is, an object which is now only known con-
ceptually (as possible; may later be known perceptually (as
actual). The reason the concentual knowledge is considered
knowledge of a "possible thing," is that the elements in the
knowledge situation are such that they may enter into a per-
ception. Sould the knowledge situation be such that no per-
ception of the thing could ever be possible, then the concept
would not be a concept of a "possible thing." A context, thus,
in which a thing is known conceptually only, is a context
revealing a "possible thing," if it is potentially a per-
ceptual context (or if it is logically implied by experience,
of course). Though this internre tation is not given by Kant,
it is, nevertheless, suggested by the following:
Through the concept the object is thought only as con-
forming to the universal condi tions of possible empirical
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knowledge in general, whereas through its existence it
is thought as belonging to the context of experience as
a whole ,51c.
There is, moreover, a sense in which the Dine —An-Sich
is also potentiality. Kant undoubtedly thought of it as an
actuality, but Hegel is right in showing5 ^ that a "thing-
in-itself" can only be a potentiality, 57e for the actuality
is what the thing is concretely. The concrete thing is the
thing in a situation that includes the thing and its entire
context, including its being known. These relationships are
what make the thing what it actually is. "In itself" the
thing is an abstract potentiality.
Logically, possibility means thinkabili ty . "Critically,"
possibility means the experienceable entertained conceptually.
Empirically, potentiality means causal necessity seen in re-
verse. Metaphysically, potentiality is the Ding-An- Sich .
Epistemologically, potentiality is the contextual possibility
of a conceptual knowledge situation becoming a perceptual
knowledge situation. The last three conclusions are not
drawn by Kant, but may logically be deduced from Kant, either
by the use of his principles or by the demands of the nature
of the problems involved.
57bT KrV, B628, 29
.
57d. SP:L, sec. 124.
57e. So also in Aristotle formless matter is potenti-
ality, but only "formed" things exist (are actual).
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III. HEGEL
Hegel is the philosopher that deals with process and
becoming, with evolution and dialectical development. Hegel
thus must concern himself with potentiality. The dialectical
movement presupposes it. In fact Hegel not only concerns
himself with, but goes far towards resolving the antithesis
between, actuality and potentiality. In place of abstract
matter and form, of potentiality and actuality, he has the
Absolute Idee, the concrete universal, that embodies in actu-
ality all that proceeds out of itself (its "objectivity”) as
potentiality.
There are two aspects of Hegel's contribution to the
category of potentiality. One aspect has to do with the con-
cept of potentiality as implied in the Hegelian system. This
is the richer aspect and stands comparison with Aristotle.
The other aspect concerns what Hegel had to say about
Moglichkei
t
.
This is the more formal aspect and is based on,
but transcends, Kant's treatment of possibility. This study
will deal with both aspects, and will consider the relation
of Hegel to Aristotle and Kant under the appropriate section.
1. POTENTIALITY AND THE HEGELIAN SYSTEM
Explanation for Aristotle meant causal explanation.
In causal explanations the temporally prior explains the
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temporally posterior. Now this created difficulties for
Aristotle’s doctrine of potentiality, for causally actuality
had to be prior (priority of actuality), but logically po-
tentiality had to be prior. Aristotle never reconciled these
two positions. He held on to the concept of potentiality but
never gave it adequate metaphysical support. It remained a
logical concept drafted to perform a causal function.
With Hegel explanation was rational rather than causal.
A thing is explained when all relevant logical grounds and
relations and consequences are given. Reason (rational ground)
and consequent take the place of cause and effect. Potentiality
thus becomes the logically "implicit” and actuality the logi-
cally "explicit." Development is the implicit becoming ex-
plicit. Reason is not static but a process. Subjectively it
is reasoning. Logic, however, is objective as well as sub-
jective, for Reason is the first principle of the world. 58 A
logical explanation is thus a metaphysical explanation. The
Idee is implied by all the categories and it, in turn, in-
cludes them all. Since the categories describe the Absolute,
then the logical implications of the categories provide the
only way metaphysics can be rationally understood. The logi-
cally implicit is the metaphysically potential.
This, however, is true only of Hegel’s concrete logic.
58. Wallace, LOH, 294. "Things are what they are
through the action of the notion, immanent in them, and re-
vealing itself in them." (The references to Hegel’s works
are made by giving the name of the English translator.)
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It is obviously not true of formal logic. The concrete logic
is based on experience because metaphysics is based on experi-
ence.^ The categories are the noetic framework of metaphysics
because they are the rational framework of our experience.
Should experience not conform to these categories, they (not
experience) would be invalid. The higher categories are
"implicit" in the lower categories because the lower categories
are more "abstract" (have less determination); the higher
categories, however, are not always logically "deduced" from
the lower categories, but are often arrived at by considering
empirical experience. For instance, to use an empirical
illustration, the concept "oak" is implicit in a "concrete"
definition of an acorn, but this concept of oakness is not
"deduced" from the concept acorn. It is discovered belonging
to the definition of acorn only through experience. The
"implicit" can thus mean the "potential" only in a "concrete"
logic where deduction goes hand in hand with experience and
both are seen against the richness of relationships. The
an sich is the potential because more relationships and
determinations are possible for it, or because it can lead
to richer experience. It is potential because more is forth-
coming.
59. Dr. Brightman (vs. Stace ) interprets the Dialectic
as a search for empirical hypotheses, a process of bringing
in empirical relations to form new hypotheses. From Dr.
Brightman* s point of view the Phenomenology, not the Logic
is the key to the Hegelian spirit. J
'.
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In Hegel's concrete, metaphysical logic, then, the
potential, the an sich, contains its determinations in itself,
i.e. implicitly. Actuality is fur sich . It contains its
determination explicitly, for itself. Each step in the dia-
lectic contains the former step fur sich (explicitly, actually)
and the next step an sich (in itself, potentially). Carrying
this to its logical conclusion Hegel shov/s that Being contains
the Notion ( Be griff ) implicitly, and that the Be griff contains
Sein explicitly. "Being therefore is the notion implicit,
before it has been explicitly put as a notion." 60 The Absolute
Idea, "the pure form of the notion," 6 -*- is the final dediiction.
It "contemplates its content as its own self. . . This con-
tent is the system of Logic." 62 The Idee is the actuality of
potentiality, and the potentiality of actuality, thus re-
moving the dualism of the actual and the potential. They are
metaphysically one in the Absolute.
As Hegel points out62a there is a close resemblance
between Hegel's Absolute who "contemplates its content as its
own self," and Aristotle's Prime Mover whose activity is pure
self contemplation. In spite of the resemblance there is,
nevertheless, an important difference. Aristotle's Prime
Mover is separated from the world. His contemplations do not
60l Wallace
,
LOH, 576.
61. Ibid., 374.
62. Loc
. cit.
62a. PM, 316.
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include the potentialities of the world. He is thus "abstract”
in the Hegelian sense. The Absolute, on the other hand, is
"concrete." The content of his contemplation is the whole
system of logic. It is in him that the potentialities of the
v/orld "live and move and have their being."
2. HEGEL'S CONCEPTION OF MOOLICHKEIT
Kant distinguished logical possibility from "real"
possibility. Moglichkei
t
in the logical sense applies to the
non-contradictory. "Real" possibility applies to whatever
conforms to the conditions of experience in general. Hegel
accepts from Kant this division of Moglichkei
t
into formal
and real but gives the terms a different content. As Kant's
critique advanced beyond logical possibility to consider the
meaning of possibility in terms of the conditions of our ex-
perience, so Hegel's dialectic advances beyond the critique
to show the meaning of possibility in terms of the concrete
whole of experience and reason. For Kant a "real" possibility
is what may be experienced; for Hegel a real possibility is
what coherently belongs to a given situation taken as a whole.
When Kant considers the content of concepts abstractly (in
isolation) he can see no difference between a hundred real
dollars and a hundred possible dollars. But when he considers
the difference in relation to "the context of experience as
a whole"^2^ he sees that actuality makes a difference. Hegel
62b. KrV, B629
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insists on considering Moglichkei
t
in just such relations,
for it is there that it makes a difference. For Hegel the
categories are not just principles of the Vers tand , but are
ontological principles as well.
i. FORMAL POSSIBILITY AND CONTINGENCY
In order to understand what Hegel means by Moglichkei
t
it is first necessary to understand what he means by Wirklich-
keit. Actuality is the union of "essence" and "appearance."
Thus actuality is the synthesis of the We sen book. Essence
is the "inner," the ground of existence. Existence is the
appearance of essence. Appearance is the outer, the forth^
shining of essence. Thus "the appearance shows nothing that
is not in the essence, and in the essence there is nothing but
what is manifested." 6^ Actuality is the category of this
union of essence and appearance. It is the truth of the two.
Actuality being a concrete category includes the union
of inner and outer, and also their difference. 64 The inner
seen now from the point of view of actuality becomes possibility;
the outer becomes contingency. Possibility is the essence
"lifted out of reality," an abstraction. 65 The essence in re-
63~. Wallace, LOH, 252.
64. Ibid., 259: "Such a concrete category as Actu-
ality includes the characteristics aforesaid and their difference."
65. Wallace, LOH, 260: "Possibility is really the
bare abstraction of reflection -into- self, -what was formerly
called the Inward, only that it is now taken to mean the ex-
ternal inward, lifted out of reality and with the being of a
bare supposition."
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lation to appearance is ground, in relation to actuality it
is possibility. Possibility, however, is only the "form" of
essentiality. "Possibility and Contingency are the two factors
of Actuality, —Inward and Outward, put as mere forms.
Nov/ as essence is, in one of its moments, self-identity, so
possibility, as the form of essence, is "the mere form of
identity-with-self . In this sense of possibility every-
thing is possible which is not self-contradictory. Such a
concept is not very fruitful, for any nonsense may be con-
ceived as a possibility, no matter how improbable it is.
Again on this basis everything is impossible "for every content
(a content is always concrete) includes not only diverse but
even opposite characteristics."^ (Matter, for example, is
"the unity of attraction and repulsion.") The possibility or
impossibility of a thing depends rather upon its relation to
the totality of reality. Kant and Hegel thus both discard
formal possibility as a philosophical principle.
As the inner, from the point of view of actuality, is
possibility, so the outer is, from the same point of view,
66~. Ibid., 263.
67. Ibid., 260.
68. Ibid., 262.
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contingency. Hegel bases this deduction on the conclusion
that "what is only internal is also only external: and v/hat
is only external, is so far only at first internal." 69 Since
the inner is possibility, then the outer is likewise possibility.
But this is the possibility not of essence, but of existence.
As such it is contingency. Contingency is the form of ex-
istence, as possibility is the form of essence. Contingency,
thus, is not only the form of self-identity, but also "has
its ground... in somewhat else" (as existence has its ground
in essence). Having its ground in "somewhat" else, the
contingent is dependent and so either may or may not be.
ii. REAL POSSIBILITY AND NECESSITY
The concept of the contingent moves on to the concept
of real possibility, which Hegel uses in a different sense
from Kant. For Kant real possibility means conformity with
the conditions of experience. For Hegel real possibility
means the presence of the sum total of conditions necessary
to actualization. To understand real possibility the con-
tingent must first be seen as "the condition."
The contingent implies the condition, for since the
contingent is v/hat may be only in relation to that on which
it depends, that on which it depends is the "condition."
From another point of view the contingent, in an interrelated
W. Wallace, LOH, 252.
70. Ibid., 263.
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system, is itself also the condition of something else. In
its relation to others it is contingent; in the relation of
others to it, it is condition. The condition, moreover, as
being the possibility of something else is an existing pos-
sibility. A contingency, because it is a contingency, may
not be; but a condition, to be a condition, must be. "By the
condition of a thing we mean first, an existence." 7 -*- The
contingent, thus, depends on its condition, and when it be-
comes an existent it in turn becomes a condition.
The concept of the condition leads to the concept of
real possibility, because real possibility means the presence
of all conditions necessary for actuality. When "all the
conditions are at hand, the fact (event) must be actual." 73
Real possibility is not only what can become actual, nor
what does become actual, but what must become actual. Thus
real possibility leads to necessity, the union of possibility
and actuality.
In this process from real possibility to necessity
there are three elements: "the Condition, the Pact, the
Activity." 74 These elements are abstract aspects of the
71. Wallace, LOH, 266.
72. Hegel's deduction of real possibility is based
on the two aspects of condition: existence and possibility,
an existent in itself and a possibility for something else.
Real possibility is the synthesis of these two aspects. Loc
.
cit
.
73.
74.
Ibid., 267.
Ibid., 271.
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concrete actuality. As aspects the conditions, the fact, and
the activity are each considered to be prior to the necessary
actualization. The conditions are the passive materials for
the fact and enter into its content. They are conditions be-
cause they can so enter into the fact. The fact is the actual
result considered abstractly, by itself. It becomes an ex-
istent by using up the conditions, from which it proceeds.
The activity is "the movement which educes the fact from the
conditions in which it is potentially present,” 75 thus
abolishing the conditions by transforming them into the fact.
Necessity results, then, when an actuality (fact) is viewed
in relation to both its conditions and the activity that
educes the fact from the condition. When thus viewed a
necessity is relative, for it depends on its antecedents.
It is thus a dependent or a contingent. True necessity,
however, must contain its conditions within itself. It derives
from its antecedents but includes them in itself as part of
itself (though of course in an altered form). This view of
necessity, as containing its conditions within itself, is the
concrete view. It gives "absolute necessity." 75
75 ~. Ibid., 272.
76. This term is used in the "larger logic" (Johnston,
SOL, II, 183ff
. ) , but the idea is present in the smaller logic
also: "anything necessary accordingly comes before us as
something due to a supposition, the result of certain ante-
cedents. If we go no further than mere derivation from ante-
cedents however, we have not gained a complete notion of v/hat
necessity means. V/hat is merely derivative, is what it is,
not through itself, but through something else; and in this
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Necessity so viewed is nothing but an exposition of
the Absolute. As Hegel puts it: "That, however, which ex-
pounds the Absolute is Absolute Necessity which is self-
identical as being self-determining." 77 The Absolute, then,
is the one true embodiment of necessity. Necessity being the
union of potentiality and actuality, the Absolute, therefore
is the metaphysical basis of potentiality, of actuality, and
of the actualization of notentiality . But what content shall
begiven to this metaphysical basis? What does absolute
necessity reveal about the metaphysical relationship of po-
tentiality and actuality, of condition and result? Hegel’s
answers are given in the next subdivision of this study.
iii . METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS
There are three metaphysical theories that are intend-
ed to explain the relationship of potentiality to actuality,
of condition to result. Hegel calls them: "(a) The Relation-
ship of Substantiality," "(b) The Relationship of Causality,"
"(c) Reciprocity or Action and Reaction."
(1). Substance. Absolute necessity takes the re-
lationship of substance and accidents because substance is
(76 cont.j way it too is merely contingent. What is neces-
sary, on the other hand, we would have be what it is through
itself; and thus, although derivative, it must still contain
the antecedent whence it is derived as a vanishing element in
itself. Hence we say of what is necessary, 'It is.’ We thus
hold it to be simple self-relation, in which all dependence
on something else is removed." Wallace, LOH, 267f.
77. Johnston, SOL, II, 187.
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"the totality of the accidents, revealing itself in them as
their absolute negativity, (that is to say, as absolute power).
Substance then reveals itself in its accidents yet is the power
of these accidents. These accidents reveal substance yet are
vanishing elements in substance. The accidents are the content
of substance, substance is their "form activity."^ But on such
a view no reason is given why the actuality (the accidents)
should be considered as the content of substance (the possi-
bility). A substance has as content a certain accident, but
substance itself (abstractly considered) is mere power or
possibility, thus why should it have as content this particular
fact or actuality? Substance as defined does not explain
"this." Substance is mere possibility and mere possibility
cannot explain definite particular actualities. Causality is
an attempt to give such an explanation.
(2). Causality. In the relationship of cause and
effect, the effect is what it is because of the cause. At the
same time the effect contains the cause: "there is no con-
^ v
itent in the effect that is not in the cause. . . in fact /
it is in the effect that the cause first becomes actual and
a cause, The effect is thus a necessary actuality, for it
must reveal the cause. It is this actuality because the cause
78^ Wallace, LOH, 274.
79. Loc. cit.
80. Opus cit., 277.
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was such a possibility. But the necessity is, at first sight,
only in the effect. The cause seems to be an unexplained fact.
If a causal explanation of every cause is attempted, the attempt
ends in the infinite regress. A little reflection, however,
shows that more is involved in the causal relation. As was
intimated above^ the cause first becomes actual in the effect.
The cause depends upon the effect for being a cause. But
even more is involved. If a cause is to produce an effect,
the cause is to be the active substance which works on the
"passive" substance "on which the effect takes place. "81 But
this latter, being substance, is active also and so reacts on
the first substance. This is reciprocity.
(3). Reciprocity. In reciprocity the distinction
between cause and effect breaks dov/n. Both sides are causes
and both are effects, for in reciprocity they so interact
that each receives from the other, and each gives to the other.
The effect is the result of action and reaction. Reciprocity
is thus "the proximate truth of the relation of cause and
„82
effect. As such reciprocity is the consummation of Sub-
stance. But this consummation is no longer Substance itself,
but something higher-- the Notion, the Subject . "^ Substance
is thus overcome. The Notion takes its place. The Notion is
the seat of potentiality and actuality. The Notion is the
8iT Wallace, LOH, 279.
82. Ibid., 281.
83. Johnston, II, 214.
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development of potentiality into actuality. The Notion is
thus the in-and-for itself, das -an- und- fur-sich , the potenti-
ality, the actuality, and the process of development.
Potentiality and Actuality are united in Necessity.
The relation of substance and accidents is a metaphysical
aspect of this synthesis. But the truth of Substance is the
Notion and the truth of Notion seems to be Spirit. This last
step cannot be elaborated here beyond a quotation from the
Phenomenology : "Everything depends on grasping and expressing
84
the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well."
In Hegel, then, the thing "in itself" is the thing in
potentiality. It is the essence or ground of the actual
thing. But the possibility of its becoming actual is real
(genuine) if it is in proper relation to the rest of reality.
Potentiality, therefore, is a term applicable to the thing
"in itself," abstractly considered. "Real possibility" is
a term applying to the availability of all the conditions
necessary for the ac tualization of a thing. Real possibility
thus refers to the whole context in which the potentiality
must be present in order to become an actuality (the potenti-
ality itself, of course, being part of the whole context).
When all the conditions are present the potential becomes
actual. In fact as long as all the conditions remain present
actuality is a necessity.
84. Baillie’s translation, POM, 15
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In truth, however, the concrete actuality is not this
resultant fact, but the whole process. Potentiality and
"actuality" are abstract aspects of one concretely actual
process. Hegel and Aristotle, thus, both consider the whole
process as the real thing. The analysis of the process as
made by Hegel may also be compared to Aristotle’s. Hegel
analyzes the process into condition, fact, activity. Aristotle
has 6 € x c ' The € r c Py £
is the Hegelian "activity" by which the potential becomes
actual. The Hegelian "condition" is the Aristotelian
S v 1/ i- jU- l S , with the exception that Hegel includes the
total context in the condition; Aristotle’s 6 V 1/ 1 S
describes just the main (or decisive) element. What Hegel
calls "the fact" is Aristotle's £ X T £ A Cxc/^ . It is the
final l resultant) stage of the process.
The great difference between Aristotle and Hegel is
not so much that Hegel considers the total context as real
possibility and Aristotle discusses the potentiality of the
one decisive element in the context (e.g., acorn is the de-
cisive element in the context acorn, soil, water, temperature);
but rather that with Hegel the resultant actuality contains
its conditions within itself, whereas with Aristotle the
actuality transcends the condition. In Aristotle the "man
puts away childish things," but in Hegel the man carries the
child along with him. Aristotle thus has the dualism of Po-
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tentiali ty (Matter) and Actuality (God) as explanatory prin-
ciples of the world. Since God, however, transcends all
potentiality, this principle is left without any me taphysical
support. In Hegel the Absolute is the actuality which contains
all potentiality, for the actual contains the potential within
itself. To state all this in Aristotelian terms, it can be
/
said that the Absolute is the metaphysical basis of
(potentiality), (actuality), and £ f c Pyc t&c,
(the activity that actualizes the potential). The world
process is thus the self-determination of the Absolute Spirit.
IV. WHITEHEAD
In Whitehead's metaphysics, the Primordial Nature of
God constitutes the conceptual realm of potentialities
(eternal forms), and actual entities constitute the temporal
realm of actuality. It is a philosophy of organism because
the movement of "creativity" is the movement by which the eternal
objects l forms) enter into ever new and cumulatively related
actual entities, ii'ach new actual entity being both a new
creature and a new unification of the world, the system may
be called "organic pluralism," for the individual entities
are the ultimate real things, yet are in organic relation to,
or (to use Whitehead's terminology) prehend, one another, and
so involve each other. The creative advance of these actual
entities is the ordered process by which these entities take
..
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up the relevant factors of other entities and the relevant
possibilities of eternal forms into themselves to create new
entities. This is the advance into "novelty." These novelties
are real because possibility is real. The reality of possi-
bility is found in the realm of eternal objects (forms).
These are the "pure" or "general" potentialities. The relevancy
of any of these general potentialities for any actual entity
is conditioned by the "given" v/orld of any actual entity.
This "given" world defines the "real" potentiality of any
actual entity, and consists of the nature of the actual entity
and its relations or environment.®®
In contrast to Kant and Hegel the realm of possibility
is, for Whitehead, wider than that of actuality. Not only is
the realm of "pure potentialities" wider than that of actuality,
but each "real" potentiality points beyond the actual, since
it has one or more relevant eternal objects which it may
select in its advance into novelty. --In contrast to Aristotle,
Whitehead gives potentiality a firm metaphysical basis. The
"Primordial Nature" of God is the realm of potentialities.
This Primordial Nature corresponds to the Prime Mover of Aris-
totle, but with the important difference that Aristotle’s
Prime Mover is pure actuality, whereas the Primordial Nature
of God is pure potentiality. In Aristotle, the Prime Mover
was the metaphysical ultimate of actuality. In Whitehead,
85. PR, 101.
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the Primordial Nature is the metaphysical ultimate of potenti-
ality.
The following investigation will consider Whitehead’
s
treatment of potentiality under three headings: 1. Pure
Potentiality; 2. ''Real” Potential! ty; 3. Potentiality and
Actual Entities. Under (l) will also be considered the Prim-
ordial Nature; under (2) the "Consequent Nature;" and under
(3) some implications of "relevancy" as applied to the relation
between eternal objects and actual entities.
1. PURE POTENTIALITY
The ultimate category in Whitehead’s system is that
ft
of "Creativity." Creativity is the ultimate category be-
cause it is the most universal characterization of the process
of integration and of the appearance of novelty. Creativity,
thus, is not ante res but in rebus, it "is found in the crea-
ture." It is not a cause (productive cause) of the world,
but an explanation of it, for "creativity is the universal of
ftfi
universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact." It is
characterless, the pure form of activity, the abstract notion
of actuality. Being such an abstraction (or generality),
86^ PR, 31.
87. Whitehead, Art
.
( 1926 ) , 61 (italics mine). In PR
it is stated thus: "It lies in the nature of things that
many enter into complex unityT"’ T31 ) (italics mine.)
88. PR, 47.
.*
. ?<rt
.
.1
t! * so t > 1 1 r *ffT
'S * r* tos . i-o
.
: ,
" j : , i,
itrso *v ' Yi'.t
)
a : .
,
.
j
-
,
: "MO
Ic . ©a lo
. J
,
. . .
r
:^T *Tri Itw X ’ I :> * . or.
71
It Is never found by itself, but always under the conditions
of the actual world. Consequently "there is no meaning to
89
‘creativity 1 apart from its ’creatures'." " Creativity is to
be made definite, to be given some determination, to become
a created fact, if it is to be effective. This primordial
"created" fact is the "primordial nature" of God. It is the
"eternal primordial character," the "aboriginal instance of
this creativity," the first actuality, for "it is the function
of actuality to characterize the creativity." Creativity
is not willed by God, rather God is the eternal, primordial
character of creativity. V/hat this seems to mean is that
91God is the concrete category of creativity. His nature is
creativity in actuality. He does not will creativity; He is
creativity. As such he Is not the transcendent cause of the
world, but the immanent creativity in the world. But creativity
is the principle of novelty. Thus God is the concrete factor
of novelty. He is this because his primordial nature is the
"conceptual valuation" of the realm of eternal objects. 92
Eternal objects are "pure potentials." Eternal objects are
Q9l PR7 344.
90. Loc
. cit.
91. If this interpretation is correct, then the
problem raised by Miss Emmet as to how creativity first limit-
ed itself so as to act to create God, is a false problem, for
"creativity" is the abstract category and "God" is the concrete
category of one and the same principle. Of. Emmet, WP0,247ff.
92.
PR, 46.
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not the only condition of novelty. The given world is another
condition. Nevertheless eternal objects are the only source
of novelty. Acorn, plus v/ater, plus chemicals in the soil,
plus temperature, plus time are the conditions of an oak, but
not the only conditions. The possibility of oakness is
smother condition. But since oakness is not present in either
acorn, water, chemicals, temperature, or time, then oakness
is the source of novelty in the other conditions. Now the
other conditions are actual entities, but oakness is an eternal
object, a universal. Potentialities are thus universals,
Platonic forms, or eternal objects. "Eternal objects, as
God's primordial nature, constitute the Platonic Y;orld of
ideas." But this needs qualification, for Whitehead seldom,
if ever, accepts another's terms without some modification.
It is not the purpose of this inquiry to go into a
detailed exposition of the resemblances and differences be-
tween the Platonic Forms and Eternal Objects. It is neces-
sary to state that there are differences, so that there will
be no initial misunders tanding. Having made the statement,
it is only necessary henceforth, to proceed with the ex-
position of Whitehead's position, making, perhaps, occasional
comparisons v;ith Plato.
95~. PR, 73.
94. Miss Emmet has done this in WTO, chapter 5.
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An eternal object is a pure potential, a form of
definiteness for the specific determination of fact."'- Being
a mere possibility it can be described "only in terms of its
potentiality for ’ ingression’ into the becoming of actual
entities.” A mere potentiality, however, cannot affect a
process, for the "ontological principle” states that only
97
actual entities can condition the process of becoming.
Eternal objects attain the status of actuality by being en-
visaged by the primordial nature of God. It is this concept-
ual realization of the eternal objects by God, that places
them under the "categories of existence.” What this seems to
mean is that all potentialities are in God. God Is not only
the actuality of creativity, but also the actuality containing
(conceptually) all possibilities. God is the activity that
can create novelty. 9^
Though God can create novelty in the world, there are
"no novel eternal objects.” 99 All possibilities are once and
for all in the primordial nature of God. Thus novelty comes
not from new possibilities, but from new "ingressions" of
95. PR, 32.
96. PR, 34.
97. PR, 36.
98. This interpretation
tation already given relative to
follows
God and
from the interpre
creativity.
99. PR, 33.
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these possibilities in different actual entities. God’s
primordial nature organizes the eternal objects relevant to
the actual entities of the temporal order. 100 This is neces-
sary or there would be no order of nature. If any actual en-
tity could become any possibility the world would be chaos.
For this reason, "each eternal object has a definite,
effective relevance to each concrescent process." 101 What,
however, makes one possibility relevant and another irrele-
vant? Is it a fiat of God consistently held to, so as to be-
come a law of nature, or is it a situation arising in the
temporal process of the world itself? Whitehead implies that
it is the latter. This situation he calls "real potentiality."
2. REAL POTENTIALITY
God gives order to the eternal objects and offers the
actual entities relevant possibilities. The relevancy of
these possibilities is determined by the given conditions of
the situation. This given situation:
Is a limitation laid upon the general potentiality pro-
vided by eternal objects, considered merely in respect to
the generality of their natures. Thus, relatively to any
actual entity, there is a ’given' world of settled actual
entities and a 'real' potentiality, which is the datum
for creativeness beyond that standpoint. This datum. . .
is nothing else than the actual world itself. 10 '
100. Ibid. 63f
.
101. Ibid. 64.
102. PR, 101.
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God then is the depository of all potentialities and the
selector of relevant possibilities, but his selections are
"real," (that is, acceDtable) only if they conform to the
nature of the situation. The situation is the given world,
rather than the actual entity taken by itself. The philoso-
phy of organism considers each entity in its relations. As
far as an entity’s own nature is concerned several possibilities
could be relevant to it. But of these only one is accepted.
This accepted one is the "real" possibility and is selected
105because of its relevancy to the total situation. Eternal
objects are first limited by the nature of the entity itself,
and then finally selected by the situation in which the event
finds itself.
The selection, however, is a free selection. In this
sense every actual entity is a "decision." "By actualising
one, it excludes other alternatives
.
It selects on the
basis of its subjective aim. This is the free internal pur-
pose, or the structure of its internal nature. As it comes
in contact with other entities in the history of its develop-
ment, its selections are progressively determined by the in-
fluence of these other elements, but ultimately "each con-
crescence is to be referred to a definite free initiation and
103. PR, 34.
104. Emmet, Y/FO, 114.
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a definite free conclusion. The initial fact is an
"appetition" which in its final fact is the "satisfaction,’ 7
the entelechy. The concept is teleological. But if freedom
is to be genuine, God must hold out more than one possibility
to actual entities. At the beginning, in the stage of greater
indetermination, the potentialities are greater; in the final
stages the potentialities are more limited. God, morever,
not only presents relevant possibilities, he also tries to
persuade the occasions to make the proper choice. But being
"choices," the actual occasions are free to reject God’s
persuasions
.
God’s persuasions are those of love. He is the object
106
of desire in "the initial phase of each subjective aim."
But the actual entities are free to disregard this initial
impulse, and all other persuasions of God. If they do dis-
regard his attempts at persuasion, then he does not combat
them:
God's role is not the combat of productive force with
productive force, of destructive force with destructive
force; it lies in the patient operation of the over-
powering rationality of his conceptual harmonization. . .
He is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading
it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness.^-07
105~I PR, 75.
106. PR, 522. Note resemblance to Aristotle's Un-
moved Mover.
PR,107. 525f
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"Real" potentiality, then, has two asoects. (1) It
is the "subjective aim" of the entity itself. (2) It is the
total situation into which the entity has entered, or the
given concrescence of that entity. There thus seem to be
two ultimate types of actual entities. (1) God, who is the
mental pole of the world, and (2) temporal entities, which
form the physical pole. As entities, both types are ultimate
facts. Yet both are related, for God desires to save the
world and to attain complete actuality, so he ”ob jectifies"
the actual occasions in his "consequent" nature. The actual
entities, desiring God, move towards him in their choices of
possibilities. God, nevertheless, is the principle of order
and novelty; he takes brute fact and transforms it through
the persuasive love of his rationality. "The world" is the
process of this transformation.
3. POTENTIALITY AND ACTUAL ENTITIES
The temporal world process is the actualization of
potentialities. In fact potentialities had to be actualized
in some fashion primordially
.
The primordial nature of God
is this eternal actualization. But it is not a complete
actualization. It is only a conceptual realization and needs
the creative process of novelty to give it actualization in
the temporal world. These temporal actualizations are
objectified in the Consequent Nature of God. Potentialities
thus have their eternal seat in the mental pole. In them-
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selves they are abstractions. In things they have only a
consequent reality. The mental sphere is its true abiding
place
.
"Things,” or actual entities (to be exact) would re-
main static were it not for potentialities. An actual entity
can proceed to novelty only by envisaging eternal objects.
But how can this be? To say that God presents the relevant
possibility is not sufficient. The possibilities must somehow
be incorporated by the actual entities. The acorn may have
the possibility of oakness presented to it, and all the con-
ditions may be ready for the "ingression,” but still nothing
would happen unless there is some activity that welds the
two together, that makes the "ingression" not only possible,
but actual. But whence this activity? It cannot come
from God or from the actual entity. God does not use force
on the entity, so the entity must reach out for the possibility
itself. If, out of the many relevant possibilities that God
presents, the entity picks out one, it must be because it has
an affinity (either mental or physical) for that possibility.
In fact that is why that possibility is relevant, because
there is an affinity for it in the entity. But in that case
we duplicate the possibility, for to have an affinity for a
108. Hegel saw the truth of this and so had the
three factors in necessity: the condition, the fact (i.e.
the eternal object;, and the activity. Cf. above, 61f.
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potentiality means that the potentiality is part of the nature
of the thing. The reason an acorn becomes an oak rather than
a pup is due as much to the nature of the acorn as to the
eternal object oakness. The term "relevant possibility" is
thus loaded. It assumes what it sets out to explain.
Y/hitehead’s dipolar treatment thus has the disadvantage
of placing potentiality outside of actual entities. Aristotle
made it immanent. Whitehead has to get potentiality back into
the entity and so he speaks of "subjective aim", but what is
this but an affinity or a potentiality? Whether we speak of
the potentiality of an acorn or of the subjective aim, what
we mean is that an acorn may, under favorable conditions, be-
come an oak. As long as entities have natures of their own
that nature includes its "relevant potentialities." Are then
eternal objects superfluous?
If eternal objects were merely possibilities in the
abstract they would be superfluous. This inquiry has shown,
however, that all potentialities are in God, and that God is
the creative activity that makes for novelty. God’s task is
so to order possibilities that they may be actualized. God
as the primordial actual entity is thus more than the mere
"conceptual valuation" of the eternal objects. He is the
organizing activity as well. But his organizing activity has
an eye to the realization of potentialities. This means he
must know the possibilities (subjective aim) of temporal en-
tities, and must be able so to relate actual entities to each
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other that the temporal system will realize their potentiali-
ties. Potentialities must, therefore, be both in the activity
of an actual entity aiming at a realization of those potenti-
alities, and also in the system of actual entities. The
primordial nature provides this favorable system, but to do
109
so it must "envisage” the potentialities.
God does not create the world in the usual sense of
the term. God thus does not create the actual entities.
They are final realities, limited, temporal, concrete. They
are given. The primordial nature of God is also given. It
is the primordial entity, the primordial actuality of the
principle of integration and creativity. -God then does not
create the temporal entities with their subjective aims (po-
tentialities), but once they are given he "envisages” all
their potentialities (together with all possible potentialities)
and sets about to be the Creator, not of the entities, but of
the world process: of order, novelty, increase of actuality,
of creative advance. This process, in turn, actualizes his
dreams ( "envisagement" of potentialities) and becomes the
Consequent nature of God, or God’s dream progressively coming
true. But throughout it is a co-operative enterprise of
actual entities, finite and divine.
109. The interpretation here given is based on some
implications of whitehead’s system, rather than on any de-
finite statement made by Whitehead.
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V. PRESENT STATUS
The present status of potentiality, as of causality,
is problematic. Science appeals to it less and less, many
philosophers qualify it more and more. Professor Frye of the
department of physics of Boston University stated, in a per-
sonal interview, that the concept of potential energy is used
in elementary physics but not in relativity physics. Even in
elementary physics the term is a relational one. It is "energy
existing in a positional form, not as motion." 110 The raised
cannon ball and stretched bowstring are examples. In biology
the theory of epigenesis has generally supplanted the theory of
preformation. Thus growth is not looked ur>on as an "unfolding"
of potentialities as fixed structures, but is rather a progres-
sive organization. The various plasma regions of each indivi-
dual egg are at first equipotential, but in development become
differentiated
.
111
Philosophers use the term with varying degrees of en-
thusiasm or irritation. The disciples of Whitehead make ex-
tensive use of the concept, as can be well understood. Others
are not so happy in the use of it. As Professor Demos pointed
out,-Lfc to the empirical minded philosopher possibility seems
abstract, to the rationalist it seems barbarous. So Bradley
110 . Oxford English Dictionary , "Potential Energy. :l
111. Werkmeis ter, POS, 349.
112. Art. (1926) ,234.
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(a rationalist) urges caution in the use of potentiality,
for unless wisely used, he warns , the term "will remain, in
the end, a wide-spread source of confusion and danger."-"
James Ward would be rid of the concept entirely, because it
neither describes nor illuminates the process of development. 114
Verweyen claims that possibility is a thought- ( Gedanken-
)
symbol. As such it is rightly used. When it is made into
power or potentiality, then it is "hired out," falsely
hypos tatized. 115
Though the concept of potentiality may not be alto-
gether welcome,US it is, nevertheless, generally used. The
controversy concerns not its use, but its interpretation. Where
there is hesitancy in using the term, there is generally the
fear that it will carry false metaphysical implications. As a
"thought symbol" referring to the beginning of a process or acti-
vity, the concept would find general acceptance. The issue is
whether it is more than a formula by which change may be pre-
dicted. The present attitudes towards this issue may be classi-
fied as the positivistic attitude and the ontological attitude.
The positivistic theories are those views that entertain potenti-
ality only as a thought or concept by which the beginning of a
process may be conveniently related to its end. The ontological
113. AR, 387.
114. RE, 108.
115. POM, lllf.
116. Whitmore, Art. (1939), 239.
*,
.
. i
-
.
.
'
* 0
. . .
. Jo-J
• *
. 1 - c JJ
1 1
. j v
*
.
83
theories maintain that potentiality is in some sense objective
or ontological.
1. POSITIVISTIC THEORIES
The positivistic theories of potentiality either deny
the concept any ontological validity or refuse to consider
the ontological problem. That the acorn may become an oak
is true, but to attribute the process to potentiality is not
very illuminating. What is this dark mystery "potentiality"?
All that can be seen is a process. Potentiality and actuality
are abstractions of the knowing mind. First the mind abstracts
from the process and then it sets about to hypostatize the
abstract aspects. This is inadmissible. Potentiality as a
term expressing a certain regularity of sequence is permis-
sible, but as a description of an ontological principle it is
qui te meaningle s s
.
Verweyen belongs to this group, since for him possi-
bility is merely a thought symbol. The positivists and pheno-
menologists naturally belong here. Others, though not positi-
vists in other regards, may hold a positivistic view of ootenti-
117
ality. James Ward is undoubtedly one of these. Hartmann
belongs here since for him the distinction between possibility
and actuality is created by the limitations of the human mind
and its temporal form of experience. In Reali t^t the two are
identical. Any view of potentiality which considers it merely
117. MUW.
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as a form of the mind's way of knowing is positivistic in the
sense here used.
2 . ONTOLOGICAL THEORIES
The ontological theories claim that there must be
some objective connection in the "thing” or in reality that
makes the concept of potentiality valid. The concept of po-
tentiality is a way of knowing because there is "something"
objective corresponding to it that may be so known. But what
is that "something"?
The answers are various, but they may be grouped to-
gether under four types: the Platonic (or conceptualis tic
)
type, the inherence type, the individualistic (or particular-
istic; type, and the environmentalists (or contextualis tic
;
type. The Platonic type is represented by Whitehead and his
followers. The term Platonic is not to suggest that they
hold Plato's view of possibility. It merely means that for
this type possibilities are eternal forms In some sense or
other. They are "real" but not existent. Yet they are more
than subsistent; they are relevant to exis tence .H® They are
the metaphysical ground of potentiality in existence.
The "inherence type" is represented by the theory of
preformation, the scholastic doctrine of powers inhering in
substance, and some conceptions of the "tendency" theory.
118. A realm of pure subsistents without contact with
existence cannot metaphysically "ground” potentiality.
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In this type the future state is embedded in the present state
as a germ to be evolved (in original sense of the word), or
119
as a power that acts so as to bring about the future state.
The individualistic type is represented by Strong. x ^
Inherent powers, eternal forms, vital principle are not needed.
Development proceeds from the nature of the thing itself.
It aims "to steer clear of the Scylla of transcendent onto-
logical forms, on the one hand, and the Gharybdis of imminent
[sicj teleology on the other . The potentiality is real,
but its reality is the thing in development.
The environmental! s tic type is represented by
Loewenbergl22 and Pepper. Possibility is a matter of con-
text. "The possible is but the actual in embryo lying in the
womb of a context . The possible is not an eternal form,
nor a law of the "thing," nor a "power," but the ever chang-
ing environment producing ever new configurations.
It is obvious that not all these tyres are mutually
exclusive. In fact a philosopher may hold to more than one
type. Thus Whitehead holds to eternal forms and environ-
119. Dubray, "Actus and Potentia," Catholic
Encyclopedia , I, 124-125.
120. Art. (1934).
121. Ibid, 119.
122. Art. (1934).
123. Art. (1934).
124. Loewenberg, Art. (1934), 104.
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mentalism, but the source of oossibility is, for him, the
eternal forms. Bowne ' s voluntaristic interpretation of po-
tentiality has not been considered as a separate type,
for it is a specification under the individualistic type.
The issues raised by these theories will be treated
in greater detail in the chapters to follow. Here, however,
it seems adviseable to compare the men interpreted in the
historical section with the theories presented in this section.
Though allowances have to be made, yet in a general
way the views of the four philosophers studied may be related
to these four theories. The discussion has already shown
that ’ hitehead upholds the conceotualis tic theory, Aristotle,
as interpreted in this investigation, holds the individualistic
theory. Kant is fundamentally a positivist for the Ding - an -
sich cannot be known. For him the difference between the
actual and the possible is not a difference in objective
status, but a difference in the way a thing is being known
(i.e., perceptually or conceptually). Hegel’s manysidedness
is shown- by the fact that he has affinities with all the
theories. Fundamentally he holds to the individualistic
theory, but interprets the "thing" as a totality, a whole
process. 1^6 He also emphasized relations, and so the context,
125. TTK, 96, 108; MET, 87f.
126. For comparison with Aristotle see above, 6V f
.
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in which a thing finds itself. A thing out of its context
is an abstraction. In addition he is a conceptualist, since
concepts are real for Hegel. In fact the Notion ( Be griff )
reconciles the dualism of potentiality and actuality, according
to Hegel. "The movement of the Notion is development : by
which that only is explicit which is already implicitly pre-
sent. "127 Though he does not hold to a mechanical view of
the inherence theory, 1^8 ye t he admits that:
The truth of the hypothesis on the other hand lies in its
perceiving that in the process of development the notion
keeps to itself and only gives rise to alteration of form,
without making any addition in point of content. It is
this nature of the notion -- this manifestation of itself
in its process as a development of its own self,-- which
is chiefly the view of those who speak of innate ideas. 129
Inherence has meaning, in other words, only when interpreted
as the rationally implicit.
127. Wallace, LOH, 289.
128. Loc . cit. In fact none of the four philosophers
investigated advanced the inherence theory, though Aristotle
has been interpreted in terms of inherence by the Scholastics.
129. Loc. cit.
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CHAPTER III
FURTHER DEFINITION AND PROBLEMS
INTRODUCTION
Chapter I gave a preliminary definition of the con-
cept of potentiality. Chapter II presented a brief historical
survey. The present chapter will give a further definition
of the concept, will show its similarities to and differences
from related concepts, especially possibility; and will in-
quire into some of the metaphysical problems of the category.
This latter inquiry will merely present the issues. The rest
of the study will discuss them more fully.
I. POTENTIALITY AND RELATED CONCEPTS
Possibility
.
The concept most related to, and oft
identified with, the category of potentiality is that of
possibility. At times the two concepts have been used inter-
changeably even in this study. But strictly speaking the
two terms are different. Chapter I showed that possibility
is the broader term. Not all possibilities are potenti-
alities, but every potentiality is a possibility. Possi-
bility is a logical concept and means the thinkable. Potenti-
ality is a dynamic concept and refers to what may actually
take place. Possibility is the conceivable, potentiality is
the "becomeable . " Possibility may be used in the sense of
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potentiality, because the conceivable may also become actual.
When used in this sense the problems of possibility and those
of potentiality are the same, but since possibility has a
larger meaning many of the problems of possibility are irrele-
vant to the problems of potentiality. This is especially
true of the logical aspects of the concept of possibility,
e.g. whether there can be a possibility that will never become
sin actuality.
It is not the purpose of this inquiry to go into the
various meanings of possibility. xhis study considers possi-
bility only in so far as it is significant for the concept
of potentiality. In this sense "the only possible is the
implications of the actual,"-*- for potentiality presupposes
the actual. That is, a potentiality can become an actuality
only if there is an actuality that can so become. In other
words this study is concerned with possibility only in the sense
of "real possibility," and this is used not in the Kantian sense
of the experienceable
,
but in the sense of what can issue forth
from the structure of reality. It is not concerned with
"other possible worlds,"^ but with the possibilities of this
world. Thus understood possibility is practically identical
with potentiality. The real possibilities of the actual are
the potentialities of the actual.
IT
2
.
Bowne
,
TTK, %03 .
A Leibnizian problem.
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Possibility is practically identical with potenti-
ality but not wholly, because the two concepts have different
connotations. Usage has loaded the terms. Real possibility
is the bare idea that a conceivable event may take place since
the nature of reality is such as it is. Given some parts of
what is necessary to produce an actuality, then the presence
of the other necessary parts produces the actuality. If the
nature of reality is such that the missing parts may be
presented, then the event is a possibility. Possibility then
is what is coherently conceivable as realizable in relation
to the whole of reality. Possibility thus emphasizes the
whole. Possibility, again, with its connotation of conceiva-
bility is more adventurous, more coherently imaginative. It
is enticed by the idea of novelty. Coherent conceivabili ty
also implies concepts, so possibility suggests a realm of
universals, concepts. Forms; or it may suggest a Conceiver.
If possibility is loaded with connotations, potenti-
ality is weighed down with them. Potentiality connotes the
idea of power. Potentiality may thus be conceived as possi-
bility plus power. Dewey, for example, puts it thus:
Potentialities are to be distinguished from abstract
possibilities
.
The former are existential "powers” that
are actualized under given conditions of existential inter-
action. Possibility, on the other hand, is a matter of
an operation as such -- it is operability.^
37 Ranzoli, DSF, "Possibility," 875f.
4. LOG, 289. Dewey as an Instrumentalist substitutes
"operation" and "operability" for "conception" and "conceiva-
bili ty."
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So when Aristotle speaks of potentiality he uses the term
£ 1/ IfV- I't (
S
.
Kant, on the other hand, being interested in
Moglichkeit , interprets the possible oak as the concept oak,
which becomes actual when connected with sensuous experience.
It is the attribution of power to potentiality that led
Verweyen, as was shown above, to say that potentiality is the
hyrostatization of the logical concept of possibility. 5
Potentiality has other connotations. Including the
concept of power, it suggests causation rather than novelty.
Possibility looks ahead, potentiality as power looks back-
ward. Potentiality generally is attributed to one thing or
.
event, whereas possibility Involves a whole context. That is,
the potentiality of an egg is to be a chick, but the possi-
bility of its becoming one depends on a context of favorable
elements. Potentiality, again, is properly ascribed only to
the decisive element in a context. In a context of seed, soil,
water, temperature, the decisive element is the seed. The
same soil, water, temperature, will produce different plants
when different kinds of seeds are used. Potentiality is thus
to be ascribed only to the seed not to the other elements. n
Thus Bradley says that potentiality validly applies to a con-
dition only when "that part of the condition which appears at
FT PDM, 94f
.
6. The Scholastics take exception here. They say
the seed has active potentiality and the other elements have
passive potentiality.
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present can . .
.
produce causally the rest," and it must
effect this "without the entire loss of its own existing
character . "^ Both possibility and notentiality are found when
some part of what is necessary to produce an actuality is
given; but possibility refers to the availability of the other
parts, whereas potentiality refers to the action of the "decis-
ive" element upon the other parts. Possibility, consequently,
is more general, meaning the availability of alternatives;
whereas potentiality is more definite, meaning the definite
power (or activity; by which a thing becomes something else.
Again potentiality often has a teleological connotation, an
egg is a potential chick, whereas possibility is changeability
in general; it is possible for H2O to be either ice, water,
or vapor. To say that water is potential ice would be to
connote (though not logically imply; that water has an "urge"
towards the ice stage, which of course is not so. It is a
neutral possibility. Aristotle uses potentiality in this
"neutral" sense, but he does so only when he has in mind
c ^
"matter. " however, is only "passive potentiality,"
whereas & ^ (S is "active potentiality." So ever Aristotle
has two different ideas in mind, though he uses the same term.
At any rate the present general connotation of potentiality
is telic
.
The purpose of the above analysis was not only to
7. AR, 385.
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help clarify the meanings of possibility and potentiality in
reference to each other, but also to show that there are two
dominating strands of thought involved in the category of do-
tentiality. It was shown that the category of real possibility
and of potentiality could be equated were it not for the
connotations that have loaded the meanings of the two terms.
Possibility is the coherently conceivable, involves the whole,
looks forward to novelty, and is conceptualis tic . Potenti-
ality is power, refers especially to the " thing” (actual
object on handj, looks backward into causal connection, is
dynamic and telic. These different meanings, however, are
not only connotations, but are also reflections of different
philosophical traditions. Plato said concepts are real.
Kant showed that when a thing is entertained only conceptually,
it is not actual but possible. The conceptualis tic theory
combines the two points of view and interprets potentiality
in terms of "real" concepts ^Forms). The concepts are not
the potentialities in the thing or of the thing, but are "real"
possibilities on their own right. The "real" is not actual
(existent;, but may be actualized. How it may be actualized
is a problem yet to be discussed, but the point here is that
the conceptualis tic view follows the Platonic and Kantian
tradition and attributes to potentiality the connotations of
possibility. On the other hand they who follow the Aristo-
telian tradition and look upon the individual rather than the
concept as the source of potentiality, interpret the term
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individual! stically and dynamically. The conceptualis tic
view has a tendency towards transcendence, and is more favor-
able to novelty. The dynamic view upholds immanence and
favors continuity. The dynamic view may take the form of the
inherence theory or the individualistic theory depending on
how "power" is interpreted and where it is nlaced.
Hegel emphasizes the concrete relations of things.
Concepts are real, but they a^e real only in their relations.
The actualization of possibilities thus depends upon the total
world system. Hegel’s system is organic. Hegel’s system is
also one of process. The individual is continually growing
till he reaches his full stature. When the height of develop-
ment is reached, the process of degeneration sets in. In the
Hegelian system are thus found the connotations suggested
both by the term ’’possibility" and by the term "potentiality."
The concrete potentiality is the potentiality of the thing in
all its connections. The concrete potentiality is thus both
the thing and its context. In so far as Hegel emphasizes the
context, he emphasizes "possibility" as analyzed in this
chapter. In so far as he emphasizes the developing individ-
ual, he emphasizes potentiality. Contextualism, emphasizing
systems, consciously or unconsciously carries on one part of
the Hegelian emphasis, the part best described by the conno-
tations contained in the concept of "real possibility." It
is evident, then, that the connotations suggested by the term
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"possibility" (real oossibility) best describe the concept-
ual and the contextual theory. The connotations suggested
by the terra "potentiality" best describe the inherence and
individualistic theory. The first two theories place potenti-
alities outside the thing. The last two attribute potentialty
to the thing.
The facts of development, of growth, of orderly
process create a formal demand for a category that can de-
scribe orderly sequence and permit a reasonable degree of
predictability. The category of real possibility, in the
sense of the implications of the actual, meets the demand
from the point of view of the context. The category of po-
tentiality meets this demand from the point of view of the
orderly "power" of a thing. It seems evident however that
the two concepts are supplementary rather than exclusive.
Potentiality as power would never become actual without the
presence of the other necessary conditions. Likewise there
would be no implications in the totality of actualities unless
each actuality had some “power" of its own.
Power. Power is the ability to act. Thus in contrast
to force power refers to the state preceding the activity.®
The concept of power and that of potentiality are closely
related. Tower may be said to be the potentiality of activity
8. J.H. Tufts, "Power" in Baldwin, DPP.
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in general, whereas a potentiality is a definite kind of power.
Potentiality thus implies a "nature" of the thing, power does
not, being the mere ability to act. Whether the "nature" of
the thing ijs the potentiality or has the potentiality remains
to be seen.
Probability . Prom an epistemic point of view a po-
tentiality is what will probably take place under certain
conditions. But the two concepts are different. Probability
is a statistical notion which deals with groups and averages.
Potentiality is a dynamic concept and deals with the -process
of the thing. Potentiality and nrobability both are in-
volved in predictability, but probability considers predict-
ability from the point of view of averages; potentiality means
predictability in the sense that if certain conditions are
present certain results will follow due to the nature of the
things concerned.-
II. FURTHER ANALYSIS
1. POSITIVISTIC ANALYSIS
The last chapter showed, in its discussion of the
"positivistic theories" that there is a formal demand for
the category of potentiality. As Bowne showed-^ the notion
9. The notion of "faculty" will be considered in
chapter V.
10. MET, 87f
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of potentiality declares that there must be a determining
connection somewhere between the later and former states of
a process. A strictly positivistic view would not even admit
that much. It woiild hold that the notion of potentiality is
merely an affirmation that the mind can construct a formula
by which it can talk about orderly sequence. It is the
mind’s way of connecting the relation of before and a^ter.
With the overthrow of causality comes the overthrow of po-
tentiality (in an objective sense;, for potentiality is a
definite causality; it is causality with definite character
or personality so to speak. Objectively considered potentiality
is no different from probability; subjectively the mind con-
ceives the end as being related to the beginning.
Such a view can satisfy none but confirmed positivists.
The mind needs an objective principle as the explanation of
orderly sequence. There must be some objective reason why
the probabilities of acorns becoming oaks under favorable
conditions are high, whereas the probability of grains of
sand becoming wheat is zero. It may be difficult to find that
reason, but it is worth trying. If the orderly sequence has
no orderly objective basis, then it is either a chance product
or an illusion. The orderliness of chance turns out to be a
greater mystery than that of potentiality. If the orderliness
is an illusion or merely a subjective form, then the problem
of the generality of the illusion becomes a mystery, or else
*.
*
•
.
.
.
.
• l
. u
.
.
.
98
Kantian agnosticism must be adopted. The exneri ence of
orderly sequence is of course a subjective experience. All
experience must be subjective. The category of potentiality
is a concept of the human mind trying to explain experience.
All concepts must belong to the human mind. The human mind
applies the concept of potentiality when it sees a regularity
of sequence so that certain ends follow from certain begin-
nings under certain conditions. Thus it is true that
orderly sequence and predictability are the marks of potenti-
ality, but it is not true that they are the entire meaning
of potentiality. Potentiality implies an objective basis for
the connections between the beginning and the end of a process.
2. ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
The category of potentiality asserts that there must
be a determining connection somewhere that ontologically re-
lates the latter and former states of a process. The potenti-
ality must thus be an actuality. In addition it is a definite
potentiality. It has a definite nature. The potentiality
of an egg is to be a chick and not a rabbit. But how can
these things be? What does it mean to speak of potentiality
as actuality? How can potentiality be definite? Definite-
ness belongs to actuality as Aristotle showed. As Hartshorne
also puts it: "If the possible is not distinguished from the
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actual by deficient definiteness, how else is it distinguished?” 11
Potentiality is something definite which cannot be definite;
it is something actual which is not yet actual. This is the
true "Paradox of Potentiality.” 12
It might seem at first that the difficulty is only a
verbal one. Potentiality must be actual and definite, but
as a potentiality it is an actual potentiality but not an actual
actuality. Such a distinction restates the problem, but does
not clarify it. What does actual potentiality mean? O’Connor15
states the Scholastic solution by saying that potentiality
is neither being in the full sense nor not-being. Potenti-
ality is thus "real” but not "actual.” Potentiality is not
actual being itself, but yet is "something real, i.e., a
power in existing things to do or to become something not
yet actual."^ But again this is merely a statement of the
problem, not a clarification. The nature of a reality that
is neither being nor not-being is not very clear, to say the
IT! MVG, 225.
12. Whitmore, Art. (1939). Whitmore, however, con-
siders the paradox the fact that it is an experience of anti-
cipation, but is based on retrospection (p.246). This may be
a psychological paradox, but the logical paradox seems to be
expressed above.
13.
14.
PE, 28f
.
Op. cit., 36.
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least. To define potentiality as a "power" is to define the
definite by the vague for the distinction between potentiality
and power is that potentiality is definite power, as was
shown above. To say that potentiality is real does not help
until it is explained what "real" can mean as distinct from
ac tual
.
Phillips14a shows that the difficulties involved in
the notion of passive potency led Scotus to deny any objective
reality to the notion. He himself, however, upholds it be-
cause, he claims, a being in "act" cannot change since it is
already in act and so is perfect. What this means is that
if an act is doing all it can, then it cannot do anymore.
Thus if there is no passive potency but only act, there can
be no change. May it not be, however, the very nature of
act to change? In this case potency is only a term expressing
this nature of act itself. It does not refer to anything real
in the act that is a potency, but only describes what happens
when an act acts. Gilson, though a Scholastic, comes close
to this conclusion:
The fact of this universal becoming is formulated in
the distinction of potency and act, governing all beings
within our experience; the distinction claims nothing
more than to formulate this experience .
l
4^
Gilson goes on to argue that "it is being as such that commu-
TZal MTP, II
,
182f
.
14b. Gilson, PT&, 270 (italics mine).
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nicates its form as efficient cause, that produces change as
moving force. n 14c These statements are penetrating, but
leaves the reader wondering whether Gilson has not transcended
the common Scholastic viewpoint. Potentiality for Gilson is
only a descriptive term, whereas for O’Connor, Phillips, and
Dubray14(i potentiality is a reality.
It may be claimed that potentiality is a reality, but
is not yet operative. Phillips seems to hold this position.
Act, for him, is perfection. Imperfection is potency. Since
things are a combination of both, then act must be limited
in them. Now the limitation of act cannot be act, nor can
it be nothing.~^ e Thus potentiality must be something, but
not active. It is passive; a reality, yet not a perfect
(acting) being. -^f Nor need this notion be limited to the
Scholastics. Others may possibly conceive of potentiality
as actual but not yet operative. Thus the paradox of an
actual potentiality is what exists non-operatively, but still
exists. Given the proper conditions the operation starts.
When the operation starts the potentiality has become an
actuality. The existence of the potentiality cannot be known
till it becomes an actuality, but it must have been there
14c. Op. cit., 271.
14d. Cf. above, 10.
14e
. Phillips, MTP
,
II, 188.
On. cit., 11,183.14f
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before to operate at all. Here, however, the mystery has
been merely shifted, not solved. What is a non-operative
actuality? If it does absolutely nothing, it is nothing. 15
If it does something else, then the "something else" is
accounted for, but not the potentiality. (i.e., in so far
as the "something else" is not the potential activity that
leads to the actuality in question, that activity is still
non-operative and so non-existent, a nothing) . Again the
relationship of this "potentiality" to the thing as it actu-
ally is nov/, creates a problem. How can a thing which as
actuality is full of activity have a non-operative potenti-
ality in it?
Nor can a way out be found by considering potenti-
alities as real in a subsistent sense, for either the realm
of subsistence is unrelated to the actual world and thus can-
not account for progress here, or if it is related then there
must be some reason in the actual world why one potentiality
rather than another is relevant. In discussing Whitehead it
was shown that the term "relevancy" is loaded. It nuts po-
tentialities back into entities.
The environmentalist (or contextualis t ) position
meets a similar difficulty. The total context may be more
than the sum of its parts. Relations certainly are im-
portant. Configurations have meanings that their elements
15. Bowne conclusively showed this in MET, Chapter I.
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do not have. Yet configurations can change, contexts can
become different and have potentialities in their "womb, " -
only because the elements can change. A context of static
elements would be eternally the same. Thus the changeability
of the context, though once changedjhas potentialities in its
own right as a context of active elements (not in its own
right as abstract context), yet the potentialities ultimately
depend upon the elements’ potentialities or there would be
no change of context.
Potentiality, thus, must be nosited to account for
process, growth, development. It must be given an ontological
status or the limitation of positivism will haunt us. But
how the ’’reality" of potentiality shall be considered, or
where its metaphysical status shall be placed remains a
mystery.
16. Cf. Loewenberg, above, 85.
.
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CHAPTER IV
POTENTIALITY AND IMPERSONAL CAUSATION
The questions raised in the last chapter show that
the problem of potentiality is bound up with the law of suf-
ficient reason. The latter states must somehow be connected
with the former states. The connection must be an onto-
logical one in some way or other.
The various ontological theories may be conveniently
grouped into the four types suggested in Chapter II: The
conceptualistic type, the contextualis tic type, 1 the inher-
ence type, and the whole-thing type. Like all other classi-
fications these types represent the main emphasis of various
philosophers rather an exact delimitation of their position.
The nroper use of such a classification is not to pigeon-hole
men, but to bring out different elements in a problem.
I. CONCEPTUALISM
The section on Whitehead outlined the conceptualis
t
position. The entire metaphysics of Whitehead is, of course,
not necessary for this type; all that is needed is that
Eternal Forms be considered the source of potentiality. As Demos
1. The "contextualistic type" emphasizes the envir-
onment. There is no intention of limiting the theory to the
Contextualistic School (e.g., as represented by Pepoer), nor
of identifying the one with the other.
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points out,
1
whether or not possibility depends on mind
depends, in turn, upon one's total metaphysical outlook.
But regardless of that, for a conceptualis t, possibility has
as much or as little reality as actuality, for in process
the actual disappears as soon as it appears. Possibility as
Eternal Forms "is that constant element in change which en-
ables us to know things by providing the mind with a foothold
Q
in the transitory. These eternal possibilities are the
metaphysical basis of process, but themselves are changeless,
and so may be known. "Process is the injection of possibility
into actuality."^ Without possibility there would be either
static identity or change without identity. These forms
(possibilities) are effective as causes, and are gradually
becoming concrete, for if universals are real, argues Demos,
they must have a part in the process of becoming or growth
or development. Eternal forms, then, are causes and con-
stitute a part of the "sufficient reason" for novelty.
Possibility is more than the implicit. Emergence is
genuine creativeness, more than the unfolding of what was
already there. Without such "ingression" of possibility the
future would be either wholly determined by the actual or a
result of blind chance. A causally effective realm of possi-
1. Art. (1926), 236/ (A knowledge of the above
exposition of Whitehead is assumed in this section.)
2. Ibid., 235.
3. Ibid., 234.
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bility must be Invoked to have creativity.
The view is fascinating. Novelty, creativity,
adventure are all provided for. But in spite of its fasci-
nation there are some problems that are left unsettled. How
can universals be "effective causally"? Where shall the
selection of the proper possibility be placed? Do the possi-
bilities themselves know where they belong? Do the actualities
select the possibilities? Is there some prearranged harmony
of interaction? How can more than one actuality participate
in the same possibility at the same time? To call the possi-
bility a universal, is merely to say that it applies to many
things at once, it does not explain how this can be.
It is apparent that the basic assumption of conceptu-
alism is that things cannot change or develop by themselves.
A thing is what it is, and remains such unless changed by
some "cause 1 ' from the outside. Possibilities are these
causes. How possibilities can be causes is not fully ex-
plained. Demos compares the influence of possibilities to
4the influence of ideals. Ideals however, are not effective
per se^but only through personality. If possibilities are
like ideals then mind is needed to actualize them. The
dynamic cause would then be mind, not possibility. Conceptu-
alism often seems to invoke mind. Whitehead needs God to
direct the creative advance into novelty. Demos needs mind
to actualize the possibilities, where mind is not appealed
4. Art. (1926), 239.
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to
;
the relation of possibilities to the actual world remains
a mystery.
But perhaps the basic assumption of conceptualism is
not valid. Perhaps things do change by themselves. Or per-
haps the “cause” of the change is not in a realm of subsistent
possibilities but in the immediate environment of a thing,
its context.
II. CONTEXTUALISM
The environmentalis tic position is represented
amongst others, by Loewenberg}; but the principles involved are
widely used. All Gestalt philosophies are contextualis tic
in the sense here used. It is based on the principle that
the whole is more than the sum of its carts . Consequently
a context or pattern has possibilities the individual thing
cannot have. There is no need to posit a separate realm of
possibilities. The multifarious elements in any context
continuously change about so as to create new possibilities.
These possibilities are not actual (individual things), nor
do they have a separate subsistent realm but are the "co-
actual.” ”The possible, being the co-actual, belongs to the
context where the actual is."® In a logical context possibility
is a logical possibility; in a real context there are real
5. Art. (1934). Not all the elements in this ex-
position are in Loewenberg, however.
6. Loewenberg, Art. (1934), 103.
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possibilities. The more complex the context the greater the
possibilities
.
The theory is attractive. It overcomes the limitations
of an atomistic approach. It sees the whole . It recognizes
relations. It is pliable. It accounts for limitless possi-
bilities. In spite of these values, however, the viewpoint
leaves much unexplained. Does the context cause change or
does it merely nrovide the occasion for change? It is hard
to understand how a context could cause anything. Relations
are "real” but not dynamic. Relations may provide rossibili ties
,
but "things” must have the power to actualize them. Again the
context is what it is because of the nature of its elements.
The nature of the elements includes the notentiali ties of the
elements. It takes the context to reveal what those potenti-
alities are, but the potentialities are still in the elements
not in the context. The only sense in which the context pro-
vides possibilities is that "things" in interaction with other
"things" express potentialities that before were unsuspected.
We re the potentialities not there, the context would do noth-
ing. A diamond nlanted in rich soil would never become an oak.
To retort that rich soil plus diamond is a different context
than rich soil plus acorn is true. Nevertheless, the reason
it is true is that the potentialities of the acorn are dif-
ferent than those of the diamond.
If it be urged that rearrangements produce novelty
without demanding any change from the elements except change
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of position (e.g., a pile of bricks may form a square or an
oblong) again this is true. It is also true that the possi-
bilities in squares are different from the possibilities of
oblongs. Yet it is also true that the gravitational action
of each brick in an oblong is different from the gravitational
action of each brick in a square. Should the bricks be
capable of only one type of gravitational action the other
type of configuration would not be possible. Configurations
are real, but their reality is dependent upon the activity
of the elements {or the agents) constituting the configu-
ration. Rearrangement is possible because the elements can
be rearranged, or can rearrange themselves.
Then there is the problem of the cause of the
rearrangement. Is the novelty a chance product? But chance
is no explanation. Is the novelty produced by a mechanical
law? But how can a law produce anything? It may be the
mechanical nature of the elements that produce the novelty,
but this admission again repudiates the contextual theory of
potentiality and places possibilities in "things.”
Environmentalism involves interaction, whether the
system { context) or the elements be taken as the ontological
cause of the possibilities. Since interaction is necessary
under any theory of potentiality (and, for that matter, in any
theory of the universe; it is not a special problem of this
inquiry. Nevertheless, as Bowne pointed out,"7 a system
Tl RET, 80 .
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involves an exact adjustment of every member of the system
to each other. But what effects the adjustment? The system
cannot do so because it is an abstraction. It is the result
of the adjustment, not the cause of it. The elements must
either do it themselves or it must be done for them by some
third dynamic reality. If the elements do it themselves and
they act mechanically then the adjustment must be due to some
preestablished harmony, and this drags the system back in
again. If it is done by a third party the problem of inter-
action is merely shifted. How can the third party mechanically
interact with the elements so as to adjust their interaction?
Thus neither the system (context) nor the mechanical activity
of the ’'things” (or elements of the context) can explain in-
teraction, yet interaction is needed for a context to exist,
to say nothing of the context creating new possibilities.
As in the case of conceptualism, the purposeful
activity of mind seems to be the only explanation. Adjust-
ments are then made rationally and freely, and the potenti-
alities of the context are the potentialities of the minds
working together and bringing out ever new possibilities in
each other. The history of civilization is an example.
Ferhaps this conclusion is too hasty. It may be true
for minds, but certainly "things” and their potentialities
cannot be so explained. Conceptualism hypostatizes possi-
bilities and then has to appeal to mind to get them back into
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things. Contextual! sm places the possibilities in the
system and finds that it cannot have a system without having
interacting things that found the system. Why not attribute
the potentialities to things? The present discussion has
shown that the possibilities of a context are the potenti-
alities of its elements. Conceptualism can explain the
"relevancy" of possibilities only by assuming the existence
Q
of the corresponding potentialities in things. It is true
that Chapter III pointed out some of the difficulties in-
volved in attributing potentialities to things, but the other
theories not only have difficulties of their own, but must
also attribute potentialities to things. There seems to be
no choice. But in what sense shall potentialities be attributed
to "things"? The first theory to be considered is the "in-
herence theory."
III. THE INHERENCE THEORY
The inherence theory is the view of "common sense,"
of the substance theories, of the pre formation theories, and
at times of "tendency theories." They all agree in holding
that in some sense or other the future state is embedded in
the present state. It may be a power inhering in the thing,
a germ to be unfolded, or a tendency predisposing the thing
to a certain state or activity. The inherence view seems
3. Cf. discussion on Yfhitehead; Chapter II, sec. 3
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plausible because it grounds the future states of a thing in
the past. There is a "reason" for the future. The develop-
ment is ontologically grounded and not capricious. The acorn
is potentially in the oak, the chick in the ege-, the man in
the child.
1 . TENDENCY
The last chapter of this inquiry, however, showed that
certain difficulties are present in the theory. How can a
potentiality act. unless it is actual? If it is actual what
does it mean to call it potential? As Bowne puts it: "How
to represent a potential as actual, or what the difference
would be between a potential actual and an actual actual, is
quite beyond us."^ It cannot be a dormant activity, because
the terms are contradictory. If it is inactive, then what
is it, for this study assumes that being is active through
and through, and that only the active can ever do anything.
Assuming, however, that ootentiali ty is an inactive tendency
in things, the problem then is how the inactive can ever be-
come active. It cannot become active by itself because it
would have to be active to perform its acts. The activity
either springs up like Topsy or must have some cause outside
itself. To spring up by itself is to remove all reason or
connection for the actuality, and so to do away with the
9~i TTK, 94.
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need of asserting potentiality. The alternative is to appeal
to interaction, to a cause outside the tendency.
This alternative, likewise, is full of difficulties.
How can a dormant (inactive) tendency interact v/ith anything
without acting? To put it the other way around, how can an
active cause "interact" with a dormant tendency? Interaction
involves response, and response involves action. The inactive
can be pushed around, but cannot be made to do anything. To
assume that the pushing around wakes up the dormant power is
to assume that there is some activity that is not dormant.
Organisms can be aroused from sleep because the nervous
system is not fully dormant. If the tendency is inactive it
cannot react. If it does not react, it remains inac tive . I®
The only solution seems to be to make the potentiality
active. The terms seem to be mutually contradictory, for if
a potentiality is active it would seem that it is no longer
a potentiality but an actuality. But this is not necessary,
for an activity may be checked by other activities, and the
resulting equilibrium of activities would be the thing. Thus,
in spite of Bowne, there is a sense in which a potential
actuality is different from an actual actuality. The activity
is actual, but its full expression is potential because its
10. These considerations do not exhaust the
difficulties, e.g. the relation of inactive potentialities
to one another and to the active thing is also full of dif-
ficulties, but it is best to go on to other considerations.
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full exnression is checked by other activities. For example,
a coiled spring is kept from uncoiling by the activity of the
box that contains it. The coiled spring rushes against the
box, the box holds down the spring. Open the box and the
spring uncoils. In this sense then potentiality is active,
but needs to be set free of other restricting activities be-
fore it can attain it full expression. Of course the future
state is not yet actual, but the activity that can lead to
it is actual.
^
The question now is whether this potentiality or
tendency is in the thing or is the thing itself. At first
this question seems trivial, and as far as a coiled spring
is concerned it does not make much difference. But the issue
becomes important when the potentialities of organisms are
concerned. As a matter of fact, however, the reason the
illustration of the coiled soring is convincing is just
that the potentiality to uncoil is the potentiality of the
whole spring. Put the potentiality in the spring and the
question arises what is a spring without springiness? The
cause of the uncoiling is thus not an "inherent" tendency
in the spring, but the total context, spring-in-box, or the
nature of the spring plus its environment.
11. Bowne, who inspired the analysis in this section,
was a little too hasty to consider this type of notentiali ty
satisfactorily. Though he does not say anything that would
deny active potentiality in this sense, his manner is such
as to brush it off. Gf. MET, 87f.
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2. PREFORMATION
The problems of potentiality are most dramatically
exemplified in the growth and development of organisms. The
potentiality of the coiled spring is relatively simple and
can be mechanically explained by the equilibrium of forces.
The problem of the equilibrium of forces may have meta-
physical issues of its own, but as far as the problem of
potentiality is concerned it need not solve that metaohysical
issue to make itself metaphysically respectable. The question
does arise, however, whether the potentialities of organisms
may be compared to the potentiality of the coiled spring.
In the spring there was no new development, but merely the
release of what was always there. Mechanical explanations
\
must be of this nature. The effect must be in the cause.
In machines there are no surprises and no development, but
only an unfolding (or an uncoiling, to reneat the metaphor
of the spring)
.
Preformation is the mechanical theory of development
as apnlied to organisms. In this theory all the future states
of the organism are in the germ "preformed" waiting to be un-
folded. To say that the oak is potentially in the acorn is
to assert that it is there in germinal form and that the
actual oak will be merely the unfolding (or "evolving" in
the literal sense; of the form already in the acorn. The po-
tentiality is not a potentiality for producing something new.
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but a potentiality of "uncoiling" so to sneak.
The theory has the merit of holding to mechanism
consistently, and of viewing potentiality dynamically as a
system of centers of activity ready to burst forth upon the
proper occasion. Of course such a blossoming forth depends
on interaction, but interaction must be assumed amongst
members of the universe in any theory of the universe that
recognizes members. The theory has the disadvantage of not
being in scientific favor just now. From a "scientific"
point of view the wholeness of the egg is not a sum of or-
ganized parts. As Werkmeis ter puts it: " The egg has no
preformed arrangement of specific parts, but only the potenti-
alities for such parts. In other words the egg as a whole
is determined as to type or species, but the various plasma
regions of the egg are "equipotential . " The egg is a whole,
not a sum of organized parts.
Scientific support is no sure test of metaphysical
validity, nevertheless if scientific analyses cannot find
specified parts, the theory has an initial disadvantage.
The theory, in addition, breaks down of its own complexity.
Not only is it difficult to understand how the various
differentiations could be spatiallized in the egg (the human
ovum, for example, is microscopic), but the theory requires
much more besides. The difficulty of understanding spatial
12. POS, 350.
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localization may be due to the limitations of the imagination,
but the theory, to be effective, requires a law of the v/hole
anyway. The lav/ of the v/hole organism must control the
activities of each part, getting them to work together, to
evolve (show up at the proper time), and to develop
harmoniously. The whole, in other v/ords, must supervise and
control the parts. This is especially needed since the parts
"evolve" not from just one stage to another, but over a long
series of stages. To explain this mechanically would require
the "box theory" v/here each succeeding stage in the develop-
ment was contained within the previous stage’s potential
state, just as a large box contains a smaller box and that
still a smaller one only if the boxes were originally placed
there. The alternative to either the organic lav/ or the
"box theory" would be to assume that each "potentiality"
knew v/hen to apnear and agreed to do so. But this is tenable
only if panpsychism is tenable. Panpsychism is "mentalis tic .
"
Mind makes its entrance again!
The “box theory" gets lost in the maze of the in-
finite regress. This, however, is not its only difficulty.
What is the egg in which the potentialities inhere? Clearly
it cannot be the sum total of the potentialities, for the
potentialities inhere in it. But what is the egg v/ithout its
potentialities? Assuming, nevertheless, that the egg is
something other than the potentialities, the question then
becomes, is this something a power or not? If it is not a
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power and so does nothing, it need not be invoked for it is
utterly ineffective. If it is a power of its own what does
it do that the potentialities do not do, and how is it related
to the potentialities? Does it control the potentialities so
that they work together harmoniously according to the nature
of the egg? In controlling the potentialities, however, the
controlling power must itself develop or remain the same.
If it remains the same it cannot progressively control the
appearances of the potentialities, for the control being
always the same the developing potentialities would get ahead
of it. If it changes then it either must have potentialities
of its own to account for its change, and so again create an
infinite regress, or the nature of the whole must be such that
it can change in controlling its potentialities. But if the
nature of the whole can change, there is no need of "inherent"
potentialities, for the reason potentialities were invoked was
to explain the development of the organism. If one whole can
develop without "inherent" potentialities any whole can. How
the whole can develop without pre formation may be a problem,
but preformation does not avoid it. It merely shifts it.
The fact is that the complex must come from the simple some-
where along the line, so why not place it where it is observed?
Though it is not the purpose of this inquiry to suggest
solutions to the science of biology, yet it does seem that
the theory of epigenesis , ^3 by considering growth as progres-
13. Werkmeister, POS, 349f.
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sive organization, avoids the pitfalls of the theory of pre-
formation. The egg does not have the potentialities. It is
the potentialities.
A word about vitalism: Vitalism is a theory about
organic wholes. The entelechy uses the elements to build up
the life-form. The potentialities of the organism are thus
*
the entelechy or the Elan Vital . The vital impulse "in
itself. . . is an immensity of potentiality."-^ But this
"immensity of potentiality" must become definite before it
can be a life-form for any definite organism. Potentiality
in general, like being in general, is nothing. When it is
definite it is only the ontological ground of the law of the
whole. Whether such a grounding is valid or not, does not
concern this study at this point. However, it is significant
that vitalism attributes the potentiality to the law of the
whole
.
Potentiality, if it is to be affirmed at all, must
be attributed to things, but cannot be placed in things.
Tendencies must be tendencies of the whole thing. In organ-
isms the development is a potentiality of the whole, not of
any preformation in the whole. Vitalism reaffirms this lav/
of the whole as potentiality. Panpsychism is a form of
mentalism. It can explain the whole only by a cooperation
of the mental entities with the plan of the whole
.
14. Bergson, CE, 258.
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IV. WHOLE-THING THEORY
Potentiality must be attributed to things, but how?
The above discussion has shov/n that potentiality cannot be
made to "inhere" in things. The mechanistic theory of reality
plus the analytic method of investigation have lead to the
inconsistencies of the inherence theory. The motto of
analysis is, "Divide and Conquer," but potentiality is not
so easy a victim. Divide the whole and potentiality torments
the divider by hiding in the infinite regress. The divider
must put up his sword, "for he who uses the sword will perish
by the sword." Instead, the whole object must be coaxed to
reveal its secret. Respect for the integrity of the whole,
loving admiration for the complexity yet singleness of pur-
pose of the whole, and patient observation of the whole may
prevail where the brute force of anaylsis has failed.
The whole- thing theory is the simple assertion that
the nature of a thing is such that it may become something
else. Nothing is needed in the thing but the thing itself.
A seed is an agent whose nature is to grow. Having such a
nature it grows, and growing it develops into something else,
for that is what growing means. To say that an egg is a po-
tential chick is to say that the nature of the egg is such that
under proper circumstances a chick is hatched therefrom.
But how can a thing develop into another thing? It is its
nature to do so? But what does that imply? V/hat is this
. It
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"nature" that can now be egg and later be chick? Is it the
same nature in both cases or a different nature? If the same
why does it show itself now as egg now as chick? If different
what does it mean to say that the nature of the egg develops
into the chick? In the process of development when does it
stop being egg and become chick? The whole-thing theory has
an answer.
A thing is both what it is and what it may become.
It is a process taken as a whole. No one phase of the process
is the thing. The thing is defined only by the whole process.
The nature of the thing is the nature of the v/hole process.
Only as the process is arbitrarily broken up can the question
be raised whether the nature of one stage is the same as that
of another stage. Neither stage is the nature of the thing,
for the thing is the whole process. 15 Now to speak of the
potentiality of a thing is merely to assert that a thing is
a growing process of a definite type. The beginning of the
process is potential relative to the succeeding phases, but
the dynamic nature is no single phase. It is the whole.
The development is, thus, not from one stage to another, but
is a development within the thing. The whole dynamic process
is the reality, the concrete thing. The segments are ab-
stractions. Take any two segments and the former may be con-
sidered the potentiality of the latter, but to do so is to
15. Strong, Art. (1954), 112-13, also holds that the
nature of a thing is a continuous process.
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miss the point that they are segments and to consider them
as realities. Potentiality can be attributed to the segments
only in the positivistic sense previously discussed. Onto-
logical potentiality can belong only to the dynamic definite
process. To speak of potentiality in this ontological sense
is to assert that the process hangs together, that the begin-
ning is related to the end. The nature of the dynamic activity
at the beginning of the process is such that the end of the
process follows from it. The v/hole process is the thing.
This definition of a "thing" is, of course, entirely
different from the common sense view. It defines the ontological
thing, not the phenomenal thing. If valid it gives potenti-
ality an ontological status. But is it valid? According to
this view the acorn is not a potential oak for both acorn and
oak are moments of the one thing. 7/here, however, does a
thing begin and end? This is a legitimate question; where
indeed? An adequate answer to this question requires a
separate study of its own, yet the following observations
are not out of place. (The question concerns ontological
things.) For an atomistic materialist the thing is the atom,
for common sense it is a physical object, for a monist it is
the universe. There is, thus, no agreement about the "thing."
The theory here suggested presents the concept of thinghood
required by the ontological concept of potentiality. The
views of the atomists and of common sense are inadequate.
The view of the Absolutist is not -required for the theory of
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potentiality, whatever may be required for an ultimate view
of reality. The ontological implications of the concept of
potentiality go no further than the view above presented.
In an ideal sense each philosophical problem implies a whole
metaphysics. Nevertheless the immediate problem under in-
vestigation would not justify philosophical conclusions that
would require the consideration of many other problems as
well
.
It may be objected that defining "the thing" in such
a way as to include the entire process of development hides
the problem of potentiality rather than solves it. This is
an objection from the analytic viewpoint again which insists
on considering parts rather than wholes. The first moment
of the thing, it is assumed, must somehow be the cause of the
last and since an effect must be In the cause then the end
must be in the beginning and the difficulties of the mechanistic
inherence theories are resurrected. The answer is that every
activity must have some dxiration. A process made up of time-
less instants would be timeless stagnation. Time is duration
as well as succession. "Duration implies continuity of a
process, in which there is cumulative change, whereas suc-
cession implies continuity of a series, in which there is
juxtaposition of parts that are external to one another.
16. Gunn, Time, 376
17. Mackay, Art. (1935), 179.
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Without duration there would be no flow. Without succession
there would be no change. Consequently durational activity
(and this means any activity) is a temporal whole no matter
how short the analyst wants to make the duration, for to
deny duration and reduce time to instants is to deny activity.
Activity does not take time, it is time, has duration. If the
activity is that of a developing process, then in any duration-
al segment of the process the end is more than the beginning.
Let the duration be ever so short, this is still true. Since
the duration is the briefest the analyst could make it with-
out reducing it to timeless instants, the duration has no
temporal parts, i.e., is a temporal whole. The process fil-
ling out this whole of time (really creating the time) is thus
also a temporal whole. But in a developing process the end
is always, it was shown, more than the beginning, no matter
how brief the process. As a result, this indivisible temporal
process has experienced growth, but since it has no parts
this growth is the action of the whole, be the whole ever so
small. Once the principle that a whole process can be a
growth by the power of the whole itself and not because of
its parts is accepted, then that principle applies to large
wholes as well as small ones. Logic is no respecter of size.
There may be a debate as to whether any particular object Is
a whole or not, but if It is a whole the same principles
apply to it irrespective of size. The whole-thing theory
may be wrong in considering things as wholes, but it is not
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wrong in insisting that if "things" are v/holes, then the action
of the thing is the activity of the whole, no matter how long
or how short a time it takes that activity to act. The begin-
ning does not contain the end, nor mechanically cause the
end; it becomes the end. The end and the beginning are only
aspects of the whole
.
Ontological things, according to this theory, are du-
rational wholes. ±n grasping the duration conceptually, how-
ever, the mind breaks it up into a series of static states.
These static atates are interpreted by static concepts. The du-
rational continuity of time is broken up into static instants.
The wholeness of events is cut up into a succession of static
segments. After breaking up the process, conceptual thinking
complains, Humpty-Dumpty fashion, that it cannot put the
whole together again. Such a method results in what may be
called the "slice-theory" of reality. It understands slices,
but not processes, and since the slices are slices of pro-
cesses, it does not even understand the slices. -- The
synoptic view considers things as durations. The end is the
"explication" of the beginning. The beginning is the end
"implicit." The entire process is the meaning and definition
of the thing. This is the Hegelian notion of the "explicit"
and of the "implicit" applied to ontological things.
Though the process considered in respect to its
meaning and definition may be regarded as the explication of
the thing, the process itself is not an unfolding (horrors
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of the inherence theory! ) but a growth in which the former
state is taken up and objectified ( as* Whitehead would say),
becoming part of the total cumulative whole. A snowball
rolling down a hill growing larger and larger until its
momentum is spent is a good illustration. In the continuing
and diminishing velocity of its roll, and in the continuous
increase in size, the snowball never is, but is always be-
coming. The whole process defines the snov/ball. And after
it has lost its momentum, its size begins to diminish by the
heat of the sun, until it is no more. The snowball is the
whole growth and diminution. The potentialities of the snow-
ball are the potentialities of the whole temnoral process of
growth and movement. The "slice theory" does not apply, for
at no moment does the motion stop (while it is still rolling),
at no moment is the velocity even constant, at no moment is
its size fixed. In organisms the process is both more com-
plicated and more dramatic. The manner in which the organism
relates the means to ends strikingly exemplifies the control
of the v/hole over the process.
The thing is, consequently, a temporal Process taken
as a whole. The reality of the process is the reality of the
thing. The continuity of the process is the continuity of
the thing. The development of the process is the develop-
ment of the thing. As temporal process it may be considered
both as duration and as succession. From the point of view
of duration the process is the "nature of the thing." From
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the point of vie?/ of succession the process is the actual-
ization of the potential. The potentiality is not in any
one phase, it is in the whole process. Rather, it is the
process from the point of view of the beginning. From one
point of view the potentiality of the process could be con-
sidered as the law of the v/hole process. This is a concept-
ualistic interpretation. The potentiality of the process is
its Form or law. But the law is only a formula of the
activity of the process. The activity is the dynamic reality
of the process. From this point of view the potentiality is
the dynamic activity in its initial stage. As such it is the
"original nature" of the active process. This original nature
has a character of its own. To be more exact, the original
activity has a determinate nature. There is no being in
general, no potentiality in general. All existence is de-
terminate existence. But the determinate existence is also
determinable. Its determinateness is, from one point of view,
nothing else than a limitation to its determinableness. It
can grow in just certain ways and no other. Its nature, thus,
is the definition of its potentialities. To put it differently,
its nature is the type of its process. As potentiality it
lacks complete determination { Aristotle) as determinable it
gains determination in process. Indeed the process is nothing
but the further determination of the original activity. The
full nature of the activity is realized only in its complete
process. The process takes place in an environment. The in-
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cidents of interaction cumulatively bring out the further
possibilities of the process (contextualism) . The environ-
ment is needed to actualize the potentialities of the activity,
and in actualizing them it reveals new potentialities. The
nature of the thing then is from one point of view its deter-
minableness, from another point of view it is the activity
by which it fills out its determinableness.
This entire analysis consists of just different ways
of saying that from the point of view of the whole -thing
theory potentiality is a name for all that the whole process
(thing) may become, and that all that it may become depends
on the determinate nature of the activity, working itself out
in history.
It must be emphasized that the developmental process
is not mechanical, for in mechanism there can be only an un-
folding, not a growth.-- The organic view affirms the growth
of the whole. What is the ultimate nature of the whole? Is
it the vital impulse? Is it the universe itself? Is it
Mind? The proper answer to these questions requires a whole
metaphysical system, but a fe?; points may be noted. The
vital impulse is not needed. The Sian Vital is, as was shown,
a mass of potentialities. Nevertheless unless matter be con-
ceived as inert there is no need for the vital impulse. The
nature of the whole active reality does all that the vital
V.liitmore, Art. (1939), 242.18 .
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impulse can do. If the vital impulse were intelligence
then it would be mind, but a mere vital impulse is just the
nature of the thing baptized "vital." -- The whole thing de-
pends on the universe and forms part of it, but it need not
ultimately be extended to include the whole universe -unless
some form of Absolute Monism be the only tenable philosophy.
Is it of the nature of mind? This much may be said,
at least. Mind is the only exemplification of such wholes
that human beings can understand concretely. The category
of potentiality has lead the argument to assert the reality
of temporal processes, of activity as wholes. A whole is not
a law but a process. The law is only the formula of the
process. The dynamic activity establishes the lav;, not the
law the activity. Hov; a non-rational process can act so as
to establish a formula (or lav;) of an organic whole, is hard
to understand. The category of potentiality can coherently
be held only if the process does establish such a law. The
establishment of such a lav;, however, implies intelligence.
At least, mind is the only reality v;e knov; that acts pur-
posive ly. Or, what amounts to the same thing, mind is the
only reality we knov; that develops not mechanically but out
of itself and its interactions. Such growth can be concretely
understood only in minds. As Bowne said, "The categories
must be understood as realized in active intelligence
.
The next chapter considers these issues more in detail.
19. MET, 91.
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CHAPTER V
POTENTIALITY AND PERSONAL CAUSATION
I. MIND AND THE LAW OF THE WHOLE
This study has shown that the demand for the
category of potentiality is created by the demands of "the
lav; of sufficient reason." The future must somehov; have
its raison d’etre in what has gone before. Chapter IV
showed that when the law of sufficient reason is mechanically
interpreted it loses itself in the infinite regress. The
mechanistic interpretation of the category of potentiality,
however, is not necessary. The law of sufficient reason need
not be equated to the lav; of sufficient cause (meaning by
cause mechanical production) . All that is required is that
sufficient reason be found for any event. The theory of the
whole- thing showed that the sufficient reason for any develop-
ing process is the nature of the process taken as a whole.
The expanding activity which is the dynamic action of the
process is the "thing." It develops out of itself, not in
the sense that the future is hidden in the present, but in
the sense that it is its own development. To understand the
development is to understand the "thing." In this sense the
thing is its own potentiality. It is the source of its own
growth as the flame is the source of its own light. The
category of potentiality ontologically considered is thus
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the notion of the whole-thing developing itself.
How shall such a "thing" be metaphysically conceived?
The "thing" may be formally defined as the law of the whole.
The "thing," however, establishes the lav;, not the law the
thing. As Montague pointed out^- in the physical level changes
come about through changes of relations in spatio-temporal
positions. Here the active process may be worked back and
forth so that there is no development, only change. On the
chemical level the process creates something new. H is not
water, 0 is not water. HgO together produce a synthesis and
a novelty. The novelty, however, is a compound. The elements
do not develop. They merely enter into an alliance, so to
speak. The alliance is so close that the two together create
a new effect, the result of their interaction.
On the vital level there is genuine development, and
it is on this level that the problem of the metaphysical
nature of the whole-thing first becomes acute. The activity
develops itself according to law, but is not developed by
law. The law is a true description of the activity, yet the
law forms no part of the activity. The lav;, moreover, des-
cribes the activity of a whole class of things, yet in each
case the lav; forms no part of the activity, though the activity
of each member of the class independently follows the formula
1. Art. (NR), 284.' He has three levels: The
mechanical, the vital, the sensory. The chemical level and
the personal level should have been included, however.
Montague recognizes the personal level in his Insersoll
Lecture, CSD, 74.
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in all its complicated ramifications of growth and decay.
Can the law then be coherently denied to the activity? The
relation is too close. The law describes the action too well
to be separated from the activity. The truth in the concept-
ualist view of potentiality is that the law describes the
possibilities of the "thing." But the law is an abstraction.
If the present analysis is correct, however, then the
activity by itself is also an abstraction. The activity by
itself cannot be described, and so can have no character,
and so no being. The concrete reality is the law-embodying
activity. The lav/ cannot be an abstraction in the thing
(this v/ould be the inherence error again;, nor can it be
effective as an abstraction outside the thing (the concept-
ualist fallacy), but must be one with the thing. How can
this be?
The nature of thought offers a clue. Prom one point
of view thoughts are concepts; from another point of view
they are activities. As concepts they are abstraction, but
as actively thought they are concrete. Likewise a law may
be considered as an abstract concept or as a formula enter-
tained by some mind. When being thought, a law is concrete.
A formula that is not being thought by someone is nothing.
It Is an abstract projection of a thought into the nothing-
ness of no-thought; a stratosphere v/here not even formulas
may survive in the rarefied air. The first concretion of a
lav/, then, is its being thought.
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A mind can not only think; it can also act. When a
mind acts on the basis of a law conceptually entertained,
that lav; receives its second concretion. It becomes an
objectified process (the former being a subjective concretion}.
Such a process is an objectified thought, an embodied law.
The lav; (or formula) correctly describes the process because
it guides the process, yet it guides the process not as an
abstract formula but as an actual thought of a definite mind.
A law, then, becomes objectified in a process, only if it is
thought by someone, and only if that someone who thinks the
thought can control the process. Prom the point of view of
the process this means that the activity must be such that
it can either think the formula of the process, or be con-
trolled by one who can.
II. PURPOSE AND THE LAW OF THE WHOLE
On the basis of the above analysis the potentialities
of the "thing” are the possibilities in the first concretion
of the formula of the process. If the "thing” can think the
formula itself, then it directs its own growth. If it can-
not think the law itself, then it must be directed by what-
ever can think the law and act as guide. The concrete thing,
however, is always a combination of law and activity, or, to
put it differently, is always an activity expressing some
law. Thus a concrete thing is always a thought embodying
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activity. To know the law is to know the thing. To know
the possibilities in the lav/ is to know the potentialities
of the thing. This is the conceptualis t ' s insight modified
by the statement that the law to be effective must first be
thought
.
All this is just another way of saying that the po-
tentialities of a thing are the goals the thing is realizing.
All growth is teleological. The inherence theory tried to
explain teleology by mechanism and failed. The conceptualis
t
theory v/as too abstract. The c ontextual! st was too involved
in patterns. Pinal cause or purpose must be invoked to ex-
plain the process. The mechanical categories end in the in-
finite regress, purpose looks ahead. Purpose, however, to be
an effective cause must act in some way. Purpose must mean
purposive causality. How can a purpose be a purposive cause?
o
Demos" claims that purposive action is control of
what is by v/hat does not yet exist. Now how can that be?
It cannot be held that the future controls the process for
the future not only does not exist, but the future may never
realize the purpose. The plan may fail. Demos concludes
that purpose is possibility controlling actuality. How a
possibility can control anything in a dynamic sense is no
clearer than how purpose (as a concept) can. The only
solution seems to be that a purpose can be effective only
2. Art. (1926;, 236.
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when it is a purpose of some mind. The causality of pur-
pose is volitional causality. The goal must first be con-
ceived and then acted upon. The intentions, as entertained
by a mind, are not in the future nor in a subsistent realm,
but are in the immediate present. The problem of how the
future can act on the present does not, consequently, exist.
The activity of the whole -process embodies, thus,
both thought and purpose, and thought and purpose can be con-
crete only when entertained by some mind, and can be effective
only when put into operation by the entertaining mind, i.e.,
by volitional causality. Purposive causation, moreover, in-
volves not only a conception of the end desired and the ability
to act, but also a knowledge of the means needed to attain
the end. This, in turn, implies a knowledge of the action
and reaction of each expedient in its interaction with the
other expedients and with the whole . The Aristotelian
solution that each object ’’desires" the Prime Mover is not
sufficient. The desire must be supplemented by a knowledge
of the nature of the universe.
III. GOD AND POTENTIALITY
God alone seems to meet the conditions required for
the ontological validity of potentiality. It may be that
3. As Bowne puts it: "A purpose as such is only a
conception and demands some means for its realization." (TTK,110.)
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each "whole- thing" is an intelligence that knows its destiny
and can guide its own growth. But, as was just shown, a mere
knowledge of one's destiny plus nower to control one's growth
is not sufficient. The growth depends unon the environment
(the truth in contextualism ) , for the clan can be realized
only by the utilization of the proper means. An interacting
system has already been shown to involve a Systematizer
.
4
A thing can have potential growth only if it embodies a la
w
of growth, a purpose, a knowledge of the universe. Such a
"thing” can only be a Divine volitional act. A Divine vol-
itional act has a purpose, is a concrete law of action,
knows how to utilize the resources of the universe. It may
be objected that this conclusion is too hasty. A thing need
not be God's volitional act; all that is necessary is that
a developing thing be guided by God. God provides it with
purpose and directs its interaction so that the goal may be
realized, but the thing itself is other than the Divine
c:
activity. But such arguments are just variations of the
Ding - an- sich view. What is this thing when not being guided
by God; or better, take away the formula of the activity and
what is left? The formless activity is an abstraction, a
Ding- an- sich that just acts, yet acts in no particular way.
4. Chapter IV, sec. II.
5. This is, in essence, Whitehead's position, as
well as the "common sense" theistic view.
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It Is as useless as inactive matter or substance. All exist-
ence must be in character; must have some form. Nor can it
be maintained that God merely provides the purpose (goal) but
the thing itself has the law of its activity, for the purpose
is nothing other than the direction of the activity. An
activity getting nowhere or doing nothing is no activity.
To be stare the thing may be conceived as an intelli-
gent monad guiding its own growth, but defending on God for
its successful interaction with other monads. Such a Leib-
nizian conception meets v/ith two objections. The first is
that material things as observed do not fulfill the definition
of intelligence as usually defined. The second is that it
creates an unnecessary complexity. Not only must the monad
known its goal and guide its growth, but God must also know
it and act accordingly. Now if God created the monad, he is
only duplicating his activity. If the monads always existed
they must either have always existed in character or without
determination of any kind. Existence without determination
is unintelligible. But for a monad to exist in character and
yet to have to depend on interaction for the actualization
of its character is equally unintelligible. As has already
been shown a thing is only what it does. What it can become
exists only conceptually. To assume that an acorn conceptually
knows itself as a potential oak and acts accordingly is to
ascribe to it more intelligence than is probable. Again the
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problem of its interaction is difficult. What does it mean
to depend on God for successful interaction? Either the
acorn knows when the right conditions for interacting are
present or the interaction is controlled entirely by God.
The acorn can know the right conditions only if it knows not
only its destiny but also the nature of interacting elements
and the effects of the interaction. The improbability of
such knowledge is what led to the appeal to God as the provider
of successful interaction. But if the interaction is controlled
entirely by God, then what good does it do the acorn to know
conceptually its possible future? If it cannot act on that
basis, the knowledge is entirely useless. Whitehead's con-
ception of "persuasion" does not help much. It can only
mean that God presents an entity an opportunity for interaction.
The entity must either recognize it as an opportunity (in
which case it involves a knowledge of exoedients and so of
the results;, or it interacts by necessity or chance. Chance
is no explanation and necessity again makes the acorn's con-
conceptual envisagement useless. The notion of a "thing" as
a Divine volitional act avoids these complications.
As Hartshorne points out, God is the ground of the
unity of potentiality and actuality, "and he is this because
he is ... a real agent who eternally does one or other of
various pairs of alternatives which he 'can' do."' God is
6
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free in his choice of what he shall do (consistent of course
with his nature). The Divine Will’s work is to bring about
the maximum actualization of potentiality. Evolution is
developing ever new forms, realizing ever new possibilities.
But this means that in God there are unrealized potentialities.
There are two reasons for this. (l). "If all potentiality
is also actuality in God, then the distinction between po-
tential and actual must really be an anthropomorphic illusion.”'7
The world is really not progressing for already all so called
potentialities are actualized in God. (2). If God could con-
tain all possible value as actual value there would be no
point to evolution. ^ Evolution would create no new values
for God. If it be maintained that the evolutionary nrocess
creates new values for finite selves, it is true; but then
whether the finite selves realize values or disvalues would
make no difference to God, for in him all possible values are
actualized, by hypothesis.
IV. SELVES AND POTENTIALITY
V/hat is God’s nature? The question is used in a very
limited sense. It refers to the primordial nature of God,
but not in Whitehead's use of the term as the realm of Eternal
Forms. It means what is God in himself as distinguished from
his activity; or what was God before the beginning of his
—
8.
Ibid, 37.
Ibid, 225.
..
•
.
’
.
KH ‘oq
.
'! *1
,
.
.
.
•
140
activity? The answer is, nothing. God is himself as acting.
There never was a time when he did not act, and whenever he
acts he acts according to character. But what is his character?
The answer is, the way he acts. There is no soul or core of
being, or faculty that acts. The soul, the being, the faculty
is nothing but the act. If a time can be imagined when God
did not exist and then all of a sudden he existed, this
springing into existence would be the springing into existence
of an act and no more. That act, however, would be of a
definite type. That definiteness is its character. There
is no reason why it should be of that nature rather than
another. It just is. All reality has a "given" element about
%
it; a fact that just is.
This initial act of being, ^ was not only of a definite
kind, it was also a rational act. 10 It could make plans and
realize them. It could evaluate, choose, create, and progress.
That is the nature of reason. God's nature, then, is that
of a definite rational self, or, to put it differently, God's
nature is the nature of a definite rational activity which
is selfhood. But what is a self?
9. Talking of such "springing up" of being is not
to be construed that such a view is entertained. It is merely
an attempt to explain what a nature is "in itself."
10. This inquiry has shown that mechanical activity
cannot explain novelty. Growth and development can be ex-
plained only by purposive, rational activity.
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The problem merits several different studies entirely
devoted to it. Here it is only necessary to apply the "whole-
thing" theory to self. On the basis of this theory a self
is not a soul that has activity, nor a group of ’'facilities ,
"
nor a "something" that endures through change and holds the
changing states together. A soul that has activities but
itself is inactive does nothing, and is as useless as any
"core” of being. A "something” that endures through change
without itself experiencing change can neither explain change
nor hold the changing states together, for it must make
changing adjustments to the changing states in order to hold
them together. The concept of "faculties" is likewise a
difficult concept. If the faculties are potentialities in-
hering in the soul, the difficulties in the inherence theory
are invoked. If the faculties are independent powers, the
unity of the self is destroyed. Again, if faculties are
needed to account for some functions of the self, then why
not for all? There would then be a seeing faculty, a hearing
faculty, a smelling faculty, etc., etc. But whether the
faculties be few or many the real difficulty is that the
unity of the self is destroyed or placed in some non-ex-
plainable substance in which the faculties inhere. The self,
to be sure, may be conceived as the activity which unifies
the faculties. In this case, however, the self would have
to rethink, rewill, and re-experience all that the thinking
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faculty thinks, that the will wills, and that the senses
experience . If the self has to do this eventually, why appeal
to the facilities? In denying the reality of the faculties
there is no intention of denying the functions that the
faculties are supposed to perform. What is denied is that
the faculties are needed to perform them. The functions are
functions of the self, and not of the faculties. The self,
then, is that active whole which experiences itself as such
and makes choices for reasons.
A self has a structure, an organic structure. This
structure is the self's nature. There are two factors in
each self's structure. The basic factor is the structure of
selfhood in general, which the previous paragraph described.
The other factor in each self is the particular structure
that differentiates one self from another. The character-
istics that distinguish one self from another is that self's
particular nature (as distinguished from the nature of self-
hood in general). The general structure of selfhood may be
called the law of selfhood. The particular structure is a
definite concretion of that law. The need for a law of self-
hood is shown by the general agreement in the structures of
particular selves. It will be recalled that this chapter has
shown that a lav; is an abstraction unless thought by some
mind. Now the self, of course, is a mind. Does a self, thus,
think its own law of selfhood and purposive ly follow it? As
far as human selves are concerned that is not true. They
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discover the law of selfhood in their nature. They do not
consciously follow it. The self is very well organized in
accordance with the lav; of selfhood by the time the lav; is
consciously discovered, or thought. This is what is meant
by calling human selves dependent. They follow a law not of
their own making.
The lav;, however, must be concrete, i.e., it must be
thought and actualized to determine or create anything. As
the law of a thing is a formula defining God’s creative
activity, so the lav; of selfhood may be considered the formula
defining God’s activity in creating selves. There are two
difficulties, however. One has to do with the freedom of the
created self; the other has to do with the fact that God him-
self is a self. Does God deliberately follow the formula in
his own development? God certainly does not discover the
lav; of selfhood in himself the same way a created self does,
i.e., as an accomplished fact for which he is not creatively
responsible, for then another God would be needed to think
and actualize the lav; etc, ad inifi turn . Neither can God de-
liberately create himself by the formula of selfhood for he
would first have to be a self to create himself, for only a
self can think a formula. The solution is that God’s self-
hood establishes the formula. In being a self God both creates
the formula and thinks it in one and the same act. Thus God
is independent, and self-created.
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Every self has also a particular structure, for every
being is in character. Now this particular structure of
every self is the result of the original activity of this
self (its original self-act), plus all its consequent choices
and acts. The original self-act is that self's original
character (or structure;. The original self is nothing other
than this original self-activity. This original self-act
conforms to the general formula of selfhood but in addition
it has a given element. It is what it is because it is what
it is. It is a brute fact, but not of a mechanical nature.
It is rational and can act so as to realize ends (within
limitations). The limitations of the original human self-
act are enormous. Its selfhood is thus a denendent selfhood.
It depends on God's creative activity for its general self-
activity. But as the original self-act (sustained always by
the general self-activity nroceeding from God) realizes its
goals one after another, it becomes more and more independent.
Its particular structure becomes more definite and more
creative and more rational. At any one time, however, the
character of a self is the product of its original self-act
plus all its choices, and all its acts. Its potentialities,
thus, are its ability to make rational choices within the
limitations set by the original self-act and Its consequent
acts. The potentialities increase as the self-activity be-
comes richer v/ith experience. The actualization of one po-
tentiality opens up a series of other potentialities. The
.- r >
'
.
.
.
.
.
*
.
•
.
-
• •
.
* *
-
.
•
•
•
-•
145
creation of potentialities enlarges with the increasing de-
termination of selfhood.
The greater the integration of the particular self-
structure the more that self becomes independent in the
creation of its destiny, though retaining its metaphysical
dependence on God. Finite selves, thus, are both dependent
and independent. The increase of independence, it should be
noted, does not diminish the dependence, but merely marks a
greater determination of the particular self-s true ture . Such
greater de termination of the oarticular self-s true ture still
defends upon the Divine activity that creates and sustains
the general self-s true ture . Of course there is no general
self- structure existing by itself; nor is there any particular
self-s true ture existing by itself. Any actual self is a com-
plex of the two. The term ‘general self-s true ture" is only a
description of the formula God follows in creating and sus-
taining selves. Every actual self is thus a synthesis of a
constant and a variable element. The constant element is the
lav/, of selfhood energized by God. The variable element is the
creative activity of the particular self in question. As
this variable element develops and becomes more integrated,
it becomes more and more self-determined (i.e., more independ-
ent in its creative activity), yet always dependent upon the
Divine energizing of the constant element. How God can posit
a self that is denendent on Him and yet can be independent
through its dependence, is beyond human comprehension. Never-
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theless, such a theory must be held by any view that accepts
the reality and createdness of finite selves. God creates
the self; God sustains the self (gives the self energy); God
reproduces the self after periods of unconsciousness. Thus
God provides the continuity; the finite self provides the
identity. God orovides the energy; the finite self utilizes
that energy to realize its purposes.
The self is thus creative. It creates both objectively
and subjectively. Objectively it creates works of art, states,
institutions, machines, friendships, wars, homes, philosonhic
systems. Subjectively it creates itself. In both types of
creative acts the self (allowing for the dependence already
explained) becomes metaphysically more real. Since selfhood
is the test of metaphysical reality, then the more self-de-
termined a finite self becomes the more metaphysical reality
it has. That is, as the finite self matures (develops) the
particular self- structure becomes more and more signigicant.
It does not thereby become less dependent on the sustaining
activity of God (general self-s true ture ) , but it becomes more
creative in its own independent (self-determining) activity.
Its distinctiveness becomes more prominent. This greater
originality does not destroy the general structure of self-
hood, but enriches it. But a self cannot mature without being
objectively creative as well. Self-determination goes hand
in hand with objective creation. Now in so far as creativity
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is a test of metaphysical reality (since creativity is the
test of selfhood;, the creative activity of finite selves
evinces the metaphysical reality (activity; of the finite
self. Indeed, a creative self increases the total creative
activity of the universe. The universe composed of a society
of selves is metaphysically richer (and so richer in potenti-
alities) than a universe of only one self.
Metaphysically a self must be creative to remain a
self. Thus every self is metaphysically co-operating with
God as long as it continues in its selfhood. Each self may
create with varying degrees of efficiency, but create it must.
Each self adds to the sum total of metaphysical activity.
In this it has no choice. Its only choice is in the amount
of creative activity and in the nature of that activity. A
U
self becomes morally, as well as metaphysically, co-operative
with God when it creates to the fulness of its abilities and
in conformity with God's will. It is free to reject either
or both of these. A self may lazily create at a minimum, or
it may create effectively but contrary to God’s will. In the
latter case there would be a maximum of creative activity,
but a minimum of created values (relatively sneaking). The
phrase "creative activity" is thus used in a restricted sense.
It means whatever a self freely does, be it good or bad.
Henley’s "Invictus" expresses the attitude of the metanhysi-
cally well integrated, but defiant person:
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It matters not how strait the gate.
How charge with punishments the scroll,
I am the master of my fate;
I am the captain of my soul.
Tennyson in In Memoriam A . II . H . ("Prelude") expresses the
religious attitude of the me tanhysically well integrated
person:
Our wills are ours, v/e know not how;
Our wills are ours, to make them thine.
In finite selves, then, there are three factors:
(l) a given, created fact (the original self-act; (2) a law
of selfhood (God’s general activity in creating selfhood);
(3) the rational (free) choices or purposes of the self. At
any one time the self is a result of the history of the syn-
thesis of these three factors. The more developed a self be-
comes the greater is the significance of the third factor.
In the Divine Self the second and third factors are identical.
God is completely self-created. But even in God’s self there
is a given element. It is the original character of God as
interpreted in this section. It is the primordial act of
the universe; a rational actuality; a definite self-act that
establishes its own laws, purposes, and thoughts by this very
act. No reason can be given for it except that it is.-’--*- Its
11. Stace (FOH, 50-51) would say that such an appeal
to brute fact, being an appeal to the irrational (since there
is no reason for it; leaves the universe unexolained. To
explain means to find a reason for things. Brute fact can
be a cause, but not a reason. In discussing Hegel it was
shown that Hegel preferred rational explanation' to causal
explanation. Can it be, then, that Stace is right in his
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reason is its own rationality. Its cause is its own causality.
Having purposes it progressively realizes them. Like the
finite self its character at any one time is the product of
its original self-act plus all its choices and all its con-
sequent acts. Again, like the finite self, its potentialities
are its ability to make rational choices in conformity with
its nature. The more potential! ties God actualizes, the
richer his life becomes, and the more potentialities open up
to him. Contrary to Aristotle the highest reality, God, is
not pure actuality with no potentiality. God is an actuality
(11 cont .
)
interpretation of Hegel and that both would con-
demn the appeal to brute fact? It is not necessarily so.
It is true that a brute fact which acts mechanically explains
nothing. But a brute fact need not act mechanically. It
may be a mind acting purposively. Purposive activity is
rational causality. Rational causality does not deduce
reasons, but creates them. Stace interprets reason in terms
of deduction, thus cause cannot be rational for a cause does
not deduce but produce. Reason, interpreted in terms of
purpose, however, produces and so is causal. The category
of causation mechanically interpreted cannot explain the
universe, but a universal mind can explain causation. Such
a mind may be a brute fact, as far as its own appearance is
concerned, but it certainly can explain the universal process
and itself. It explains itself by coherently describing what
it does (i.e., such a description is possible of mind). It
is ’'brute" only in the sense that it is uncaused, not that
it is indescribable. Hegel would thus not call it "brute,"
for being describable it is explainable, since for Hegel to
explain is not to deduce (as with Stace), nor to find a
cause for, but to coherently describe. Gf. above, 53ff.
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so rich he can yet realize a multitude of potentialities
beyond any human comprehension. When he realizes the ones
he chooses to realize, new ones grow out of the actualization
of the old. This is the truth in Whitehead’s theory of the
Consequent Nature of God and the objectification of actual
entities. The view here presented differs from V/hi tehead ’ s,
however, in that he allows for no new potentialities, but only
for new occasions for realizing the eternal ootentiali ties
of God’s Primordial Nature; whereas this view allows for
increase in potentialities.
All this means that metaphysically sneaking potenti-
alities are to be found only in selves. Finite selves have
potentialities, God has potentialities. Things are the
creative activity of God expressing itself in a number of
particularized formulas
.
Their potentiality is the potenti-
ality of the divine creative activity consistent with the
limits and scope of the formula. -- Potentiality is in
rational thought as implication; it is in personality as
plan or purpose; it is in physical things as formulas of
God’s creative activity.
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ABSTRACT
The problem of this dissertation is twofold: (!)• Is
the category of potentiality a positivistic or an ontological
category? (2). If ontological, what does it imply about the
nature of the objects to which the category applies? Since
the category of potentiality received its classic exposition
by Aristotle a historical survey of the concept precedes the
direct investigation of the problem.
Aristotle stresses both the epistemic and the onto-
logical nature of the category. In so far as the potentiality
of a thing describes what the thing may become, the category
has epistemic values. In so far as the potentiality of a
thing is the thing's power ) to become something
else, the concept has an ontological application. Aristotle
was interested in the potentiality of thing; Kant was in-
terested in what is involved in a knowledge situation when a
thing is known as a possibility, as an actuality, or as a
necessity of experience. Moglichkeit was for him, as "real
possibility," a modal category applying to the formal conditions
of experience in general. Logical possibility means conceiva-
bility or the thinkable. Aristotle never succeeded in giv-
ing potentiality any metaphysical support, because logically
potentiality must precede actuality, yet causally actuality
must precede potentiality. Thus potentiality was a logical
concept drafted to perform a causal function. With Hegel
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explanation is rational rather than causal. A process is
explained when coherently described. Development is the
"implicit" (potential) becoming "explicit" (actual). Reason
and consequent take the place of cause and effect. The
Absolute embodies in actuality all that proceeds out of it-
self (its "objectivity") as potentiality.
Whitehead interprets potentialities as Eternal Objects.
By "ingression" into actual entities they become actualized.
The realm of Eternal Objects is the Primordial nature of God.
This view of Whitehead may be called the "conceptual view"
of potentiality. The analysis of other recent interpretations
of the category of potentiality leads to the discovery that
there are two main viewpoints on potentiality with various
theories under each. One is the positivistic viewpoint, which
either denies the concept any ontological reality or refuses
to consider the ontological problem; the other is the onto-
logical viewpoint which attributes to the concept a meta-
physical validity. The positivistic position is that potenti-
ality is only a concept expressing a certain regularity of
sequence in change. The ontological position is that there
must be some objective basis to the regularity of sequence,
and so the concept of potentiality is applicable to that
objective basis.
Further analysis reveals that there are four typical
theories of the ontological viewpoint. (1). The conceptual
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theory just attributed to Whitehead and, of course, his
followers. (2). The contextual or environmental theory
which places potentiality in the context^or environmental
pattern of things. (3). The inherence theory which places
potentialities in things. (4). The "whole- thing" theory
which looks upon the thing itself as its own potentiality.
A critical definition of possibility and potentiality
showed that when possibility is limited to mean "real possi-
bility," in the sense of what is implied by the structure
of reality (not in the Kantian sense of "real possibility"),
the term possibility and potentiality are practicably inter-
changeable. Yet they have different connotations. Possibility
is the coherently conceivable, involves the whole
,
looks for-
ward to novelty, is conceptualistic
. Potentiality is power,
refers especially to the " thing," is dynamic, looks backward
into causal connection, yet is telic. Possibility fits in
better with the Platonic and Kantian tradition. Potentiality
fits in better with the Aristotelian tradition, in its em-
phasis on the power of the individual.
The problem of potentiality, in the ontological sense
(which is the final viewpoint adopted in this dissertation),
is bound up with the "law of sufficient reason" for the latter
states must somehow be connected with the former states. On
the conceptual theory the eternal forms are real possibilities
because they are effective causes. How this can be is not
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clearly explained. On the contextual view the multifarious
elements in any context continuously change about so as to
create ever new potentialities. But unless the elements
(individual members) of the patterns can change and develop,
the pattern would always remain the same. The inherence
theory takes on many forms, but each ends in the infinite re-
gress. It tries to explain the future mechanically by putting
it in the past, and so can never stop going further and fur-
ther back into the past.
The "whole- thing” theory is that the potentiality of
a thing is the thing itself. This dissertation favors this
view, but to be tenable it must define the thing in onto-
logical terms, not phenomenally. The "whole- thing" is an
entire active process taken as a whole. The whole is des-
cribed by a formula or lav; of the active process. What does
such a definition of a "thing" imply about its metaphysical
nature?
By an analogy with the nature of thought a lav; was
shown to be concretely entertained when being actually thought
by a mind. When a mind acts on its thoughts the lav; receives
a second concretion. A law that is not thought Is an ab-
straction. An activity that is not amenable to a definite
law is an abstraction. Both are needed. The union can be
found only in thought, for a law is nothing until thought.
An activity embodying a formula must thus be of the nature of
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thought. The activity entertaining the thought must also
know the nature of the expedients needed to realize its pur-
pose. The activity must be able to think, to act, to know
the nature of other things. Only rational minds can fulfill
these conditions. Only God can know enough about the uni-
verse to hold it to its purpose. The potentialities of things
therefore are their formulas describing the creative activity
of God within the limits of those formulas. The potentialities
of selves are their own rational self activity. In human
selves these potentialities are limited. In the Divine self
they are beyond human comprehension and ever increasing.
This conclusion is different both from Aristotle, who denied
any potentiality to God; and from Whitehead who denies any
increase in potentialities.
CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions have emerged:
1. The concepts of "real possibility" and potentiality are
practically identical, yet have different connotations,
possibility following the Platonic and Kantian tradition,
potentiality the Aristotelian.
2. There are two fundamental theories about the applica-
bility of the category of potentiality, the positivistic
sind the ontological. The ontological theory is accepted.
5. There are four forms of the ontological theory, the
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conceptual, the contextual, the inherence, the "whole-
thing."
4. The "whole- thing” theory alone coherently grounds po-
tentiality. The nature of the "whole -thing" is pure
activity embodying a law.
5. Thought alone can be that type of activity.
6. The potentiality of things is the potentiality of
God's thought creatively active within the limits of
definite formulas.
7. The potentialities of selves are their own rational
self-activity.
8. The more potentialities selves actualize the more new
potentialities open up to them.
9. God, as the Supreme Self, has potentialities beyond
human comprehension. As he progressively actualizes
them, more and more potentialities open up to him.
This conclusion differs both from Aristotle's con-
clusion, which maintained God had no potentialities;
and also from Whi tehead ' s^ which allows for no increase
in potentialities
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